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Is determinism compatibile with freedom?

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Lotus Requiem

PostPosted: Mon Jun 04, 2007 5:45 am


The topic of this debate is the question of if determinism is compatible with freedom. The philosophical dictionary at http://philosophypages.com/dy/ defines the two key terms this way:


Determinism

Belief that, since each momentary state of the world entails all of its future states, it must be possible (in principle) to offer a causal explanation for everything that happens. When applied to human behavior, determinism is sometimes supposed to be incompatible with the freedom required for moral responsibility. The most extreme variety of determinism in this context is fatalism.

Freedom {Lat. libertas Ger. Freiheit}}

The human capacity to act (or not to act) as we choose or prefer, without any external compulsion or restraint. Freedom in this sense is usually regarded as a presupposition of moral responsibility: the actions for which I may be praised or blamed, rewarded or punished, are just those which I perform freely. The further question of whether choice, the volition or will to act, is itself free or subject to ordinary causality raises the issue of determinism in human conduct. But most modern philosophers have held that (internal) determination of the will by desire or impulse does not diminish the relevant sense of moral responsibility.



Some philosophers, called compatibilists, believe that freedom can exist within a deterministic universe. (These philosophers need not be determinists themselves -- they only need to believe that if determinism is true then free will remains true.) Others, incompatibilists, believe that if determinisim is true that eliminates the possibility of freedom.

Note that this debate is not about whether determinism is actually true. To approach this question we have to first take it as a given that determinism is true, and work from there to determine what the consequences of this would be for personal freedom.
PostPosted: Mon Jun 04, 2007 7:54 am


I believe you can have both determism and freedom. Just because one event leads to another does not mean that one did not have to choose such an event.

Tammpwn


Rhapsody Scarlet

PostPosted: Tue Jun 05, 2007 5:54 pm


I see two types of determinism.

One is religious determinism, where a deity knows everything and can do anything, which I believe to be incompatible with true freedom. Because even if said deity told you what you're going to do, you would be unable to change it as such deity would then be wrong, and thus didn't know you were going to do that (contradicting the aforementioned knowledge of everything).

The other is atheistic determinism, where the future is technically determined, but it is impossible for anyone to know enough to take advantage of this. This I believe to be effectively compatible with freedom, as no one can ever take advantage of this sort of determinism.
PostPosted: Tue Jun 05, 2007 6:34 pm


What I believe is that, quite simply, God knows everything and can do anything, but that doesn't necessarily mean we aren't free to choose. He knows what we will choose, but he never actually tells us the future in full detail; thus we are never "forced" to do anything in order to prevent Him to be wrong. However, for all I know he may simply know every single possibility of choice, and where every single possible choice will lead to from everywhere (being all-knowing, He is capable of knowing and processing that much information). One also has to consider that God makes choices too, and therefore if he makes a choice that will affect the entire world regardless of the choices of people with free will he can tell people what will happen next on some occasions, and indeed has according to the Bible.
Indeed, many of the books of prophecy in the Old Testament are written as "if-then" statements: "If you obey me this will happen" and "If you DON'T obey me THIS will happen" (the result of each being different, of course.)

Xindaris


Wyedg

PostPosted: Tue Jun 05, 2007 10:48 pm


Rhapsody Scarlet
One is religious determinism, where a deity knows everything and can do anything, which I believe to be incompatible with true freedom. Because even if said deity told you what you're going to do, you would be unable to change it as such deity would then be wrong, and thus didn't know you were going to do that (contradicting the aforementioned knowledge of everything).

From my post in the fate thread:
For some people though, I think that the idea that there is a being that controls only some fate, but not all of it seems to be a contradiction due to the assumption that in order for this being to control fate it first needs to be aware of future events. And if this being already knows everything that you are going to do than there is no room for any choice whatsoever. For those who have entertained this idea I think that there is some certainty that can be had about at least the possibility of the "middle" position. First off, it is a mistake to assume that knowledge of the future is the same as fate. If you think about a time when someone told you their plans to do a specific thing, did you suddenly feel like you had some kind of control over that person's actions? Probably not unless you are somewhat insane. In this example it is easy to see that the knowledge of the other person's future actions were caused by them telling you what their intended choice was. Now try to imagine being able to view the future as a timeline. As in the above example, it is obvious that for any event to appear in the timeline someone first needs to make the choice that causes it to be there. And so, the ability to see the whole timeline of future events and even the ability to add some causes of your own ("miracles") still dosn't necessarily negate all free choice.
PostPosted: Fri Jun 15, 2007 6:51 pm


Looking at religious determinism, (which seems to be the one people are addressing most at the moment) there are a few different ways in which determinism and free will have been framed as compatible in the Christian tradition...

Thomas Aquinas' way of looking at things - God is the ultimate causal determiner of all that takes place in the world, but in addition to determining all events, he determines their mode: free or unfree. God is able to determine even free events because nothing could happen without God's concurrent activity. (This harmonizes with the Occasionalist way of looking at how the material body is linked to the immaterial soul - Occasionalists believe that mental life is caused from moment to moment by God to concur with physical events...)

This arguement asks you to accept that human agents act freely and God simultaneously determines their actions. Choices are 'free' because they are under our proximate control, and this is an adequate base for free will.

I'm not a big fan of this way of looking at things, probably because it seems to bend the idea of free will to accomodate determinism. When dealing with God, or the First Cause though, what can we expect?

- Much more satisfactory in my opinion, and much more resistant to criticism, is an argument which I hold dear - Luis de Molina's argument from 'Middle Knowledge'. This gets a little involved - I'm still working it our myself...
Molina asserts:
~In order to guide an act of will, some of God's knowledge must be prior to his decision to act. This knowledge can be called prevolitional knowledge. Knowledge gained after an act of will is called postvolitional knowledge.
~ God has three types of Foreknowledge. Natural knowledge, Middle knowledge and Free knowledge.
~ Natural knowledge is prevolitional knowledge of necessary truths - logically necessary, analytic propositions like tautologies or geometric relationhips. E.g. brothers are male siblings, or all squares have four straight sides of equal length.
~ Free knowledge is postvolitional knowledge of contingent truths - things which rely on God's volitional activity for their existence, and which could logically be false, such as the sky being blue, or the French Revolution having occured during 1789.
~Middle knowledge (scientia media), therefore, consists of prevolitional knowledge of contingent truths, or, more simply...

God is able to know what would happen in creation if he were to do one thing rather than another in looking at what choices he/she could make. Middle knowledge consists of knowing what any free creature would freely choose to do in any set of specific circumstances.

Therefore, we have a situation whereby determinism is true because of God's personal involvement in determining the events of the world through his/her choices, but free will is respected by being an integral part to the process of the mode of determinism.

Nice, huh? ^_^ Seek out 'Providence and Predestination' by Thomas Flint for a better description and some actual analysis. I'd like to hear what people have to say about this one.

As for scripture to back this up, the if-then statements brought up by Xindaris, who prefigures this argument in a way show the process of knowledge based on the outcome of a choice yet to be made. An definate example of somthing which seems to point to middle knowledge is the conversation between God and King David, as David asks whether the people of a beseiged city would give him up to the enemy *if* he decided to hide there. In the New Testament, also, Jesus speaks of how the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah would have repented and been redeemed had the same miracles been performed there as he was performing at that time...

OR, we could dissolve the problem of religious determinism which seems to dictate our actions by saying that God doesn't exist in time at all - as an eternal being, he/she experiences all of existence as a perfectly simultaneous whole. God doesn't know of our actions before we act them and constrain our free will, because God's knowledge is outside of time.

OR, some philosophers have proposed that our free will is preserved by God actually having knowledge based on probability. In such arguments, the hellenization (Ancient Greekification) of scripture is criticized for altering the conception of the Christian God to be immutable (unchanging) and impassible (unable to feel emotion or suffer). God, in fact, takes risks in governing the world because of free will. This 'Open View' approach does have damaging implications for traditional takes on omnipotence and omniscience, however...

If you've read to the end of this, you could probably take the final exam in A2 Religious Philosophy and Ethics right now. Have some cookies/muffins/aloof disregard for petty desserts. Or will you choose the mystery box? ^_^

Heterodyne


Wyedg

PostPosted: Sun Jun 17, 2007 10:18 pm


Heterodyne
Looking at religious determinism, (which seems to be the one people are addressing most at the moment) there are a few different ways in which determinism and free will have been framed as compatible in the Christian tradition...

Thomas Aquinas' way of looking at things - God is the ultimate causal determiner of all that takes place in the world, but in addition to determining all events, he determines their mode: free or unfree. God is able to determine even free events because nothing could happen without God's concurrent activity. (This harmonizes with the Occasionalist way of looking at how the material body is linked to the immaterial soul - Occasionalists believe that mental life is caused from moment to moment by God to concur with physical events...)

This arguement asks you to accept that human agents act freely and God simultaneously determines their actions. Choices are 'free' because they are under our proximate control, and this is an adequate base for free will.

I'm not a big fan of this way of looking at things, probably because it seems to bend the idea of free will to accomodate determinism. When dealing with God, or the First Cause though, what can we expect?

- Much more satisfactory in my opinion, and much more resistant to criticism, is an argument which I hold dear - Luis de Molina's argument from 'Middle Knowledge'. This gets a little involved - I'm still working it our myself...
Molina asserts:
~In order to guide an act of will, some of God's knowledge must be prior to his decision to act. This knowledge can be called prevolitional knowledge. Knowledge gained after an act of will is called postvolitional knowledge.
~ God has three types of Foreknowledge. Natural knowledge, Middle knowledge and Free knowledge.
~ Natural knowledge is prevolitional knowledge of necessary truths - logically necessary, analytic propositions like tautologies or geometric relationhips. E.g. brothers are male siblings, or all squares have four straight sides of equal length.
~ Free knowledge is postvolitional knowledge of contingent truths - things which rely on God's volitional activity for their existence, and which could logically be false, such as the sky being blue, or the French Revolution having occured during 1789.
~Middle knowledge (scientia media), therefore, consists of prevolitional knowledge of contingent truths, or, more simply...

God is able to know what would happen in creation if he were to do one thing rather than another in looking at what choices he/she could make. Middle knowledge consists of knowing what any free creature would freely choose to do in any set of specific circumstances.

Therefore, we have a situation whereby determinism is true because of God's personal involvement in determining the events of the world through his/her choices, but free will is respected by being an integral part to the process of the mode of determinism.

Nice, huh? ^_^ Seek out 'Providence and Predestination' by Thomas Flint for a better description and some actual analysis. I'd like to hear what people have to say about this one.

As for scripture to back this up, the if-then statements brought up by Xindaris, who prefigures this argument in a way show the process of knowledge based on the outcome of a choice yet to be made. An definate example of somthing which seems to point to middle knowledge is the conversation between God and King David, as David asks whether the people of a beseiged city would give him up to the enemy *if* he decided to hide there. In the New Testament, also, Jesus speaks of how the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah would have repented and been redeemed had the same miracles been performed there as he was performing at that time...

OR, we could dissolve the problem of religious determinism which seems to dictate our actions by saying that God doesn't exist in time at all - as an eternal being, he/she experiences all of existence as a perfectly simultaneous whole. God doesn't know of our actions before we act them and constrain our free will, because God's knowledge is outside of time.

OR, some philosophers have proposed that our free will is preserved by God actually having knowledge based on probability. In such arguments, the hellenization (Ancient Greekification) of scripture is criticized for altering the conception of the Christian God to be immutable (unchanging) and impassible (unable to feel emotion or suffer). God, in fact, takes risks in governing the world because of free will. This 'Open View' approach does have damaging implications for traditional takes on omnipotence and omniscience, however...

If you've read to the end of this, you could probably take the final exam in A2 Religious Philosophy and Ethics right now. Have some cookies/muffins/aloof disregard for petty desserts. Or will you choose the mystery box? ^_^

Wow! What a thorough post. I never thought of the fact that God not only knows the future, but the possible future as well. That doesn't exactly throw a wrench in my theory, but it does leave a small hole. Thanks for giving me something to think about.
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