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I've been doing a lot of reading for the past month and a half, going through classical histories alongside modern mish-mashes, and I started to wonder about the events that preceded the end of the Roman Republic. Namely, I am wondering exactly how much of the decision Crassus to invade Parthia was due to the glory of his victory against Spartacus being deferred somewhat onto Pompey the Great?

Pompey had a sort of habit of cheap-shotting his way into claiming credit for some of his victories, and his actions in Spain against Sertorius showed this. He was reluctant to bring his efforts alongside his co-commander Metellus Pius, and the issue was only really settled when Sertorius was murdered by one of his subordinates, who Pompey was then able to easily defeat. By doing that, he claimed the credit for putting an end of the Spanish campaign, and was able to speed to Italy and rout the fleeing fighters that Crassus had already broken decisively.

The results of the servile rebellion was a major point of contention between Pompey and Crassus, and it never really was resolved. It was Crassus' only significant military command, and because it didn't end decisively in his favor, he certainly had pretext to look elsewhere for his big shot, especially in the 50's BC when Caesar was in Gaul, and Pompey was in Italy, and neither were in any position to spoil his frolic into Parthia.

What exactly was there to gain other than this? Yes, Parthia was a rich nation, but they were also on good terms with Rome before Crassus launched his campaign. The Parthians were titled "Friends of the Roman Republic" similar to the Aedui in Gaul. If there was simply a need for a rich enemy to beat up on, there were plenty of jerks in and around Pontus that had no love for Rome. In fact, Pompey had earlier dealt with Mithridates, and his son would later be routed by Caesar (ie, Veni Vidi Vici). If Plutarch is to be believed in his Life of Crassus, the whole campaign was deeply unpopular by the people as well as some in his army. This is certainly more plausible than some of Plutarch's other inauspicious signs of the Parthian war, so it really begs the question if the entire showdown at Carrhae boiled down to nothing more than Crassus having triumph envy for about twenty so-odd years?

Don't get me wrong, the cataphractoi & horse archers were devestating combat units, and against immobile, unsupported heavy infantry, they are absolutely brutal. I think that the trick here is that Crassus was an incredibly poor commander. He was suckered into choosing absolutely terrible ground for combat, led astray by double agents, and over-extended his own alae cavalrymen and lost support. He had several opportunities to rectify this, none the least by opening his war through Armenia alongside Tigranes, but also by continuing to press assaults along the Euphrates. Either of these would have been better than to maneuver across open plain. You don't fight a war that big on hubris, especially against a sneaky b*****d like the Surena.

It was far from an aura of invincibility, since many Roman commanders, not the least of which was Trajan had extremely successful campaigns against them. Lots of eastern nations used cataphractoi and mounted archers, such as the Scythians and Alans. Fortunately for Rome, their performance averages out decently when you bring those conflicts into scope. I think Carrhae coined the "Parthian Shot" syndrome mainly because it was the first real engagement against that type of enemy, and Crassus was a terrible decision maker.

Thanks for the compliment btw smile