The Chinese Approach to Globalization
The last five pages are not proofread, but I handed the paper in as is. Enjoy!
Thomas Friedman, like many of his fellow enthusiasts, describes globalization, the trend toward the interdependence of states both politically and economically, in a fatalistic way that has become commonplace in recent thought. Friedman holds that globalization is driven by what he calls the "electronic herd," which moves "capital in and out of countries according to their political merits" (Waltz, 1999, 2). To attract the electronic herd, countries must don the "golden straitjacket," a homogenized package of policies that attracts capital investments. Most importantly, Friedman and others argue that globalization is shaped by ephemeral market forces; governments cannot contend. In his criticism of the fatalism of enthusiasts, Saul (2004) notes that globalization has been characterized as "inevitable&an all-powerful god" (33), and world leaders like Giscard d'Estaing have claimed that, against the "great global, indeed inevitable, forces," "[n]ation-states are powerless" (36).
If the enthusiasts are right, then we might expect all successfully globalizing states to fit a sort of template, one which Friedman argues would be represented by a liberal democracy and open markets (Waltz, 1999, 3). The question of whether globalization truly demands all nation-states to "[c]onform or suffer" (ibid.) leads us to consider an interesting case: that of the People's Republic of China. China has certainly reformed its markets, and to a far lesser extent its political structure, but it remains remarkably unique as its success as a newly industrializing country (NIC) continues to wax. There appears to be far more to the story of Chinese economic success than the overwhelming and inevitable influence of invisible market forces. In essence, the question that must be asked is to what extent has globalization actually affected the political and economic structures of China? To what extent have the Chinese been willing to don Friedman's golden straitjacket?
China retains a unique character despite the success it has enjoyed in international markets. Even after joining the WTO, China has been able to retain a level of autonomy that would not be possible if the "electronic herd" truly expected an adherence to the evanescent rules that fashion global markets. China has had to change and respond to market forces, but it has been far from powerless. Its political structures at the national level remain largely unchanged, and its economic structures have been capable of finding a sort of compromise between socialism and capitalism. Perhaps it could be said that China has donned a straitjacket in order to compete globally, but it has certainly rejected Friedman's gold one. It seems, rather, that China has made its own jacket: one that would fit in more closely with its individual status as a sovereign state.
In this paper, I will examine the road to globalization that China has taken. I will take the reader from the China of Mao Zedong to the China of today, hoping to discover to what extent the electronic herd will allow a country to deviate from its prescription for economic growth and industrialization. In the first part, I will examine the policy initiatives of Mao Zedong and his contemporaries at a time when China had become all but isolated from the outside world. In the second part, I will describe the path upon which Deng Xiaoping took China as the PRC gradually joined the international community and the global marketplace. In the third part, I will discuss efforts within China to keep it from conforming to the ideals of the West: those forces that most vehemently refuse to accept the golden straitjacket. In the final part, I will bring the discussion full circle and review the works of five authors on the subject of globalization, hoping to see whether their views help to explain or further confound the nuances of the unique Chinese approach to globalization.
Mao's Reclusive Dragon
After the revolution that placed control of China in the hands of Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), China isolated itself from the rest of the world. Mao's suspicion of outside influences and his desire to create in China a self-sufficient, powerful socialist state led him to close off the entire country while he sought to spur internal modernization (Shen, 2000). Mao brought his views of Marxist socialism to bear as he developed the centrally-planned "command economy" (Shirk, 1993, 24) that inhibited China's economic growth for thirty years.
There were six discernible periods of economic policy plans during the period beginning with Mao's takeover of the country in 1949 and ending two years after his death in 1976. During the early years immediately following the revolution, Mao and his CCP sought only to consolidate their power while quickly making adjustments that would lead China on its communist path. The CCP began by confiscating capital and fixed assets formerly belonging to the nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek and its supporters. The Agricultural Reform Law of 1950 aimed at an equal distribution of farmland among the peasants at the same time as it identified landowners and the rich as the class enemies of the people. The law helped to dismantle the feudal system that had been in place in China for millennia. The CCP continued to centralize its control of the economy by drafting a budget, reducing the money supply, and putting in place a hierarchical structure to keep an eye on local administrators. Finally, the CCP began repairing the parts of China's infrastructure that had been damaged during the war and focused on trying to bring new life into the economy's productive forces (Shen, 2000). All of this created an economy that functioned like a corporation, with the Politburo at its head. The Politburo, much like a board of directors, fixed prices and wages and assigned output quotas for productive enterprises (Shirk, 1993).
Following the recovery phase, the CCP began an initiative to completely abolish private ownership over the means of production. This period of socialist transformation, beginning in 1954, socialized properties in agriculture, handicrafts, small commerce, and large industry. The CCP's campaign tried to obtain the cooperation of the people by mass education and fear. The latter of these identified uncooperative property owners as class enemies who were either put in labor camps or executed (Shen, 2000).
The socialist transformation of China was completed ten years before its target date. Because of its success, Mao became convinced that China would be able to achieve full socialism sooner than he had expected. To this end, Mao initiated the Great Leap Forward in 1958. The Great Leap Forward tried to communize cooperative farms, double steel production, and almost double grain output, but it assumed that the majority of the people in China shared Mao's vision for the perfect socialist state. By the end of the Great Leap in 1961, the economy had been highly debilitated. Implementation of Mao's plan forced into being a number of inefficient policies that created drastic shortages of agricultural product, leading to mass starvation and malnutrition (Shen, 2000).
Economic practices shifted from a focus on revolutionary zeal to sound economic policy in 1961 when Liu Shaoqi was given the reins of China's economic policy. Shaoqi scaled back the quotas that had been set for heavy industry, and he relocated millions of people from urban centers to rural areas, hoping to invigorate agricultural production (Shen, 2000). Slowly, the Chinese economy returned to normal.
Then, in 1966, Mao engineered the Great Cultural Revolution in the hopes of reinvigorating China's revolutionary spirit. Mao argued that the CCP had been infiltrated by class enemies and rallied his supporters to begin a revolution of the masses. The newly-created Red Guard traveled the country, seeking out and removing any person or group that did not conform to the ideals proclaimed by Mao. By the late 1960s Mao had already removed from power, incarcerated, or publicly humiliated almost all of his enemies, real or imagined. The turmoil created by the Great Cultural Revolution damaged China's commerce and investment plans. Work stoppages, internal armed conflict, and other effects of the revolution led to ruinous performances in industry and agriculture. Finally, the CCP was able to convince Mao to step down. The reins were once again turned over in 1971; this time to Zhou Enlai. As the effects of the Great Cultural Revolution waned, and the country stepped out of the chaos created by Mao, Zhou attempted to revive the Chinese economy while carefully keeping in mind Mao's sensibilities to attempts at reform. The revolution continued until Mao's death in 1976 (Shen, 2000).
The transitional phase of 1976 through 1978 was represented by Mao's successor, Hua Gofeng. Hua, trying to create for himself a cult following similar to that Mao enjoyed, continued to support and implement Maoist economic policies. The changing politics of the CCP, however, led to the end of the Cultural Revolution, and the removal of left extremists from their government posts. Hua's power waned, and he was slowly eased out of office by 1978, marking the end of Mao's China and the beginning of a new era (Shen, 2000).
Throughout most of this early period, and as in most command economies, the CCP was responsible for the allocation of labor, resources, and capital investment. State monopolies were responsible for the purchase of products, and the central ministry of foreign trade negotiated all foreign transactions. The political motivation for high levels of economic growth and for self-sufficient strength led to a concentration of resources on heavy industry, leaving light industry and especially agriculture to fall behind. In the period between 1949 to 1978, heavy industrial output multiplied 90.6 times, compared with light industry, which multiplied 19.8 times, and agriculture, which multiplied a meager 2.4 times (Shirk, 1993, 26). Along with agriculture and light industry, infrastructure development was also mostly neglected, leading to energy shortages and transportation problems that limited production significantly. Railroad traffic, for instance, increased ten times during the period, while route length only doubled (27). These inefficiencies meant that more capital and labor had to be poured into industry in order to generate the same amount of growth.
Some unique aspects of the Chinese command economy further stifled economic growth during the period between 1949 to 1978. The predominance of small firms in China led to a regionally-based system in which a great deal of the responsibility for planning and coordination fell upon local administrators. While a small number of large enterprises were controlled from Beijing, the plethora of smaller firms were controlled locally, receiving their plan quotas and remitting their profits to local governments. China's massive supply of labor also led to a lack of competition among the different industries. Labor was allocated by the CCP, and workers were not allowed to change jobs. Enforced migration and lifetime employment led to further "unitism," where work units turned into communities fully responsible for the housing, welfare, retirement, and education of employees and their families (Shirk, 1993, 31). The lack of labor market competition caused by the allocation of labor and the effects of unitism led to a reduction of labor incentives and efficiency in Chinese firms, which tended to focus not on increasing productivity, but on increasing the welfare of their employees. Finally, the CCP's emphasis on party loyalty rather than professional competency led to a concentration of poorly educated managers being appointed to economic positions in firms and within the party leadership. In 1966, according to one study, managers in Chinese factories were found to have averaged nine to eleven years of education (33). Continued party meddling in economic development constricted growth significantly.
The end of China's isolationism came as Chinese leaders began to visit foreign countries in the mid-1970s. The astonishing gap between China and the rest of the world, including even Japan, shocked many of the leaders that had ventured out of the country during this period. Hua Gofeng initiated the process of industrialization with what he called the Great Leap Outward, which pursued high-speed heavy industrial growth by combining orthodox Maoist economic policies while pushing for foreign investment. The plan had been based on overly optimistic projections and proved unsustainable. By the end of 1978, after having opened China's doors to foreign trade, party leaders began to realize they had almost nothing to export besides oil. The CCP felt itself slipping into an economic crisis, and the political arena warmed up to the idea of reform (Shirk, 1993).
Deng and Chinese Market Reform
Deng Xiaoping reentered the picture after Mao's death in 1976 with the intention to succeed Hua Gofeng as leader of the CCP. In order to push his ideas for a real socialist market economy, Deng promoted radical market reforms and sought allies by promising special economic treatment to local leaders. After Deng's success in wresting power from Gofeng, the contest to succeed Deng took form. This consistent political competition colored the atmosphere of market reform during the 1980s, which has focused more on particularistic contracting via special economic favors in return for political support rather than universalistic rules and policy initiatives (Shirk, 1993).
The market reforms enacted during the span of Deng Xiaoping's leadership were heavily influenced by the experience of the other successful East Asian NICs. In particular, China was impressed by Japan's experience with late industrialization (Nolan, 2001). The major reforms that took place during the post-1978 period and generated the momentum necessary to spur further change in state industry involved the decollectivization of agriculture, the privatization of commerce, labor reforms and a marked increase in worker incentives, and an increasing interest in attracting foreign capital and expanding foreign trade (Shirk, 1993).
Decollectivization slowly shifted the responsibility for agricultural production from collective production units to families and individual households. At first, land was leased out to households by local collective production units. In exchange, the households became responsible for providing their unit with a certain amount of output. The households could then either keep or sell the remainder. Households were allowed to invest their earnings into equipment that increased agricultural productivity. This household responsibility system became popular and spread throughout the countryside. In 1981 the central government officially endorsed the system, and it was adopted by almost all farm households in China. The land remained collectively owned, but farmers were now able to use it as if it were their own (Shirk, 1993; Webber, Wang, & Ying, 2002).
As agricultural production continued to rise, so did the financial burden that mandatory government purchases of agricultural product at fixed prices placed on local governments. In 1985 a second set of policy initiatives replaced mandatory purchases with long-term sales contracts. These contracts between farmers and their local governments allowed a greater share of agricultural product to reach the market. In addition, the release of government controls over the prices of agricultural product allowed prices to react to market demand (Webber, Wang, & Ying, 2002). These structural changes pushed an increase in private and collective industry in the countryside. The more farmers were able to collect profits from their work, the more they were able to invest in capital or family businesses. As the demand for capital increased, many farmers began to lease out their land and focus on the production of capital. Some farmers joined together to form group ventures. As capital increased, so did productivity, and by 1988 the net value of agricultural production had risen to 381.8 billion yuan, from 98.6 billion in 1978 (Shirk, 1993, 40).
The household responsibility was not an invention of Deng Xiaoping; to a large extent, it developed spontaneously from Chinese villages. Its expansion was not a threat to the CCP in Beijing, but its success helped to create an impetus for further economic reform. One major consequence of agricultural decollectivization was that it provided the commodities necessary to support a large urban workforce. The increased productivity of the countryside allowed many farmers to move into the cities to find work in light and heavy industry, freeing up a large portion of the labor force in order to stimulate further economic growth. The second and less palpable consequence of agricultural decollectivization involved the way in which it affected the CCP leadership. The success of the agricultural reforms proved to the CCP in Beijing what market competition and profit incentives could accomplish. The events of the 1980s gave a great deal of empirical support to the arguments of those leaders who, like Deng, were supportive of radical market reform. More importantly, the taste of economic growth of this magnitude forced any debate centering around the economy to focus less on ideology and more on concerns for economic efficiency and competency (Shirk, 1993).
After 1978, the CCP legalized and began to encourage the creation and development of collective and private enterprises. As soon as collective and private commerce was legalized it began to thrive because it fit outside the plan for economic development and met market demands that had been asphyxiated by the tight anti-market policies of the Maoist era. The CCP helped the new enterprises to compete with state-owned enterprises by offering them lower taxes, allowing them to keep all of their own profits, and placing no restrictions on the salaries of their employees. Because this "second economy" (Shirk, 1993, 42) did not threaten the interests of the state sector, it was allowed to flourish unchecked.
State sector reform, however, was a great deal more difficult to implement. As collective and private enterprises' share of the market grew from 9.5 percent in 1978 to 58 percent in 1988, state-owned enterprises found it significantly more difficult to stay competitive (Shirk, 1993, 43). Wages and output continued to rise in the state sector, but the speed at which they rose in the non-state sector outpaced state sector growth, and more talented workers began to move to better paying jobs in the non-state sector. The new market forces turned bureaucrats and managers in the state sector into advocates for reform. By 1991 political pressures led the CCP to allow the state sector to diversify forms of ownership within state-owned enterprises. The state owned enterprises work more closely with collective and private enterprises, leading to mergers, intra-firm diversification, and even leased capital and facilities between the two sectors.
Labor reform began in 1978 when the CCP began to seek out ways to make workers work harder. The reforms rejected the traditional socialist paradigm of "egalitarianism" and replaced it with a new socialist maxim: "To each according to his work" (Shirk, 1993, 44). Wages continued to be centrally set, but workers were rewarded with bonuses for the work they actually performed. The bonuses were tied to the enterprise's overall profits and were often tied to a specific work group, but they did improve worker productivity in the early years of their implementation.
The problem of lifetime job security was criticized during this period for tolerating lazy workers. New employees began to be hired on a basis of renewable short-term contracts, but older workers stayed where they were, in no danger of ever losing their jobs. Other labor market reforms moved more slowly. Some state enterprises began to seek out employees via advertisements and interviews. Others enterprises were still assigned new employees by the government, but managers were allowed to screen them by using academic recruitment exams. Meanwhile, collective and private enterprises were free to find labor anyway they liked (Shirk, 1993).
The most important reform to China's economy occurred in 1979 when Deng and his allies expanded foreign trade and began to allow foreign investment in an explicit effort to catch up with the other Asian NICs. In order to attract foreign investment, the CCP allowed four Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to offer concessionary customs and tax incentives to potential investors. The local economies of the SEZs thrived and became loyal supporters of Deng's market reforms. Furthermore, the CCP promoted exports in order to force domestic firms in the SEZs to improve the quality and efficiency of production of their products by exposing them to the world market. Despite some early stumbling blocks, Chinese trade skyrocketed from $20.6 billion in 1978 to $111.7 billion in 1989 (Shirk, 1993, 4 cool .
By 1984 regions outside the SEZs were demanding the rights to become involved in foreign trade. The CCP responded by decentralizing administration over foreign trade and investment. Almost immediately, every region began to compete with each other over foreign business by lowering taxes and gouging prices. Regional ministries created trading companies, further decentralizing control over foreign trade. China's massive supply of cheap labor proved an excellent incentive for foreign direct investment and creating a substantial influx of foreign capital (Shirk, 1993). Foreign investment continued to pour into China through out 1990s. In 1993 a surge of foreign investment reached up to $90 billion (Hsiung, 1995, 581), and by 1998 Chinese economic policy initiatives had made it the seventh largest economy in the world (Nolan, 2001, 186).
The Dragon and the Eagle
China's economic reforms did not occur in a vacuum. China is well-known for its pride and its strong cultural traditions, and it would not have liberalized economically had it been unable to do so in its own way and by its own means. Mao did not follow the Soviet path to socialism, and Deng did not follow the Western path to capitalism. Its experimental economic reforms added new structural forms over the old ones without displacing them. It effectively allowed capitalism to develop alongside socialism. As Webber, Wang, and Ying (2002) put it, "The old was insurance, if the new did not succeed, and could satisfy people who did not want to change" (242).
Despite all the changes that Chinese economic policy has undergone, there has recently been a strong resurgence of nationalist ideology within the current Chinese leadership of Jiang Zemin. These "proto-nationalists" have argued against the concessions that China has been asked to make to external influences in exchange for membership in international groups like the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Zweig, 2002, 260). Much of this opposition has targeted the deregulation that occurred during the leadership of Deng and the deregulation anticipated during the current Jiang regime. The current opposition to further globalization focuses on three major points. First, proto-nationalists have argued that economic integration has led to a dependency in military and technological modernization on foreign strategic interests. Second, they have seen the United States limiting China's technology sector. Third, they fear that rapid globalization will worsen regional decentralization, weakening the central government and fragmenting the national government.
Proto-nationalist concerns have also taken another route in arguing against further globalization. Foreign pressures, especially pressures from the United States, to liberalize economically have been met with far less opposition than have pressures to liberalize politically. China has been criticized for its human rights violations, but Chinese leaders affirm that they do not adhere to what they call Western values. China, like other Asian NICs, claim to follow a prescriptive set of principles they call Asian values, a mixture of market economics and Confucian communitarian ideals. Representatives of the CCP have urged that they must "constantly resist and criticize�Western capitalist concepts of philosophy, politics, journalism, literature and art," while at the same time "combating the ideology of national nihilism which completely rejects China's traditional culture" (Roy, 1994, 235). In addition to their enthusiastic rhetoric in favor of Asian values, the CCP has claimed that one-party leadership is necessary for the retention of the stability and unity that the Chinese people enjoy. "Without leadership by the [communist] party, people will become disunited like grains of sand; the country will be divided; economic construction and reform and opening to the outside world will be out of the question; and so will social stability and people's well-being" (235-236).
In response to the human rights violations for which it is accused, China asserts that it holds in highest regard the ideals of order and economic stability. Jiang has argued that Western and Asian ideas about human rights are incompatible due to the considerable social, cultural, and historical differences between them. In addition, the disparate levels of economic development between China and the United States force China to take a much stronger role in ensuring that the quality of life in China continues to improve while stability both domestically and in the rest of Asia is maintained. This is how the CCP has traditionally defended itself when it has committed actions for which the United States would criticize them. During the Tiananmen Square debacle in 1989, for instance, the CCP claimed that, had it allowed the demonstrations to continue, it would have permitted a situation that would have unraveled social stability throughout the country, leading to the utter stagnation of growth and the inevitable collapse of the nation as a whole (Roy, 1994).
Tearing the Straitjacket
If there are enthusiasts like Friedman about who chant praises to the golden straitjacket, so are there skeptics who believe the world is just the same as it has always been. Surely something of note has taken place in the world, or there would not be so many enthusiasts preaching, as John Ralston Saul might satirically say, the gospel of globalization.
Some skeptics, perhaps, have come to ignore a great deal of the changes that have occurred in recent decades due to the proselytization of the enthusiasts. Kenneth Waltz (1999) claims that "[g]lobalization, if it were realized, would mean a near uniformity of conditions across countries" (4). But, as China has shown, globalization is not, as the enthusiasts would have us believe, synonymous with homogenization. Globalization is interdependence, a condition that must exist in order to create the impetus for the CCP to reform as far as it has, but China is still nothing like the West, as Jiang would stress. States like China have, as Waltz puts it, "adapt[ed] to their environment" (6). They have done what they have had to do to stay competitive, but they have not attempted to fit a globalization-friendly mold.
Saul (2004) has also been affected by the enthusiasts. His cynical article, "The Collapse of Globalism," even refuses to use the same name as that which the enthusiasts have used to describe the current trends. Saul goes further than Waltz in claiming that the trend toward globalization has died. While the Chinese proto-nationalists may certainly like to agree, it seems they would have no reason to be so active if there was no danger of their worst fears coming true. Saul compares globalization to a fad religion. He claims that the globalization cult "contained simple, sweeping solutions and, as with all successful religions, lodged ultimate responsibility in invisible, untouchable hands" (35). In doing so, the cult of globalization freed itself from responsibility. The enthusiasts certainly seemed to feel this way, and much of the West may have agreed. But the East never followed suit. The CCP, even when it was not in control of the changes the Chinese economy went through, fancied itself in full command of the country. If anything, the Chinese experience with globalization was perceived as anything but a deliberate opening of the market. The CCP was in control. The market does not command itself.
Charles Tilly (1995) argues that globalization is, in fact, doing something. Unlike the enthusiasts, however, Tilly argues that the change is not a positive one. In his discussion of labor rights, Tilly argues that economic activities and the creation of supranational activities have removed the power of states to manage stocks and flows. While it is true that opening up the borders does limit one's ability to control what flows in and out, it is up to the state to open or close those borders as it wills. When China first began to open its markets to foreign investment, it started slowly: by creating SEZs so that it could control the flows of capital and labor from its center at Beijing. Only after the CCP realized the positive effects of opening up its market did it decentralize control over foreign trade. Today, the proto-nationalists are trying to centralize control yet again. The state, therefore, has not lost its power. At the very most, it has simply loaned it out.
Michael Mann (1997) attempts to describe how "globalized" capital flows have become. China and a number of other countries still block certain forms of capital from entering or leaving the country. Furthermore, "it retains distinct property forms (mixing private with varieties of public ownership and control)" (479). Though capital moves about throughout the rest of the world rather freely, Mann concludes that the "global-ness" of capital flows remains "impure" (489). This does not, as I have said when I responded to Waltz, mean that globalization is not at full strength. Globalization is a trend. It is a process. It begins when states start to trade amongst each other, and it ends when a world government is in place. So long as the trend is moving from the former toward the latter, we can say that the world is globalizing. States today, and China particularly so, retain a great deal of strength. It seems likely, so long as the world economy continues to grow, that the CCP will continue to release its control over the Chinese economy, but this will not cause its power over the country to wane as some enthusiasts have ardently hoped.
One of the most sober commentators on globalization, Dani Rodrik (1997) argues in "Has Globalization Gone Too Far?" that globalization today mimics to a large extent the globalization that took place during the late 19th-century. Rodrik notes that both in the 19th-century and today unskilled labor has become elastic. While in the 19th-century labor generally migrated to where the capital was, however, today capital is moving and labor is simply welcoming it in. China has been remarkably lucky in this respect. Its greatest boon has been its immense supply of cheap labor. Foreign investment has bombarded the Chinese labor markets, trying to tap into China's richest resource. Today's facilitated movement of foreign capital has allowed China to reap the profits off its large population, to the dismay of unskilled labor in developed countries, where labor laws and minimum wage requirements make such forms of investment far less profitable.
China's large population, its ample markets, and its highly adaptive decision-making abilities have allowed it to reap intense benefits from the global market without having to conform to Washington's or any other country's consensus. China's pride in its national roots have kept it wholly unwilling to adopt a straitjacket that it had not fashioned itself. It looked past the accomplishments of the West and learned from the economic accomplishments of its Asian neighbors, but it refused to mimic even them. China had to liberalize economically in order to become competitive; the electronic herd demanded that it put on some jacket, but it obviously does not require developing nations to adopt the golden one that Friedman would offer. China may not be an appropriate model for the rest of the world, but its foresight in choosing to fashion a plan for economic development especially suited for its nuances helped it to achieve unprecedented levels of economic development. If uniqueness helped China become an acclaimed international market success story, then it may be a practice worth imitating.
References
Mann, M. (1997). Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State? Review of International Political Economy, 4 (3), 472-496.
Rodrik, D. (2000). Has Globalization Gone Too Far? In T. Roberts, & A. Hite (Eds.), From Modernization to Globalization (pp. 298-305). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers. (Original work published 1997)
Saul, J. R. (2004). The Collapse of Globalism. Harper's, 308 (1846), 33-43.
Tilly, C. (1995). Globalization Threatens Labor's Rights. International Labor and Working-Class History, 47, 1-22.
Waltz, K. N. (1999, December). Globalization and Governance. Political Science and Politics, pp. 1-13.
Hsiung, J. C. (1995). China's Omni-Directional Diplomacy: Realignment to Cope with Monopolar U.S. Power. Asian Survey, 35 (6), 573-586.
Neher, C. D. (1994). Asian Style Democracy. Asian Survey, 34 (11), 949-961.
Nolan, P. (2001). China and the Global Economy: National Champions, Industrial Policy and the Big Business Revolution. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Roy, D. (1994). Singapore, China, and the "Soft Authoritarian" Challenge. Asian Survey, 34 (3), 231-242.
Shen, R. (2000). China's Economic Reform: An Experiment in Pragmatic Socialism. Westport, CT: Praeger
Shirk, S. L. (1993). The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Webber, M., Wang, M., & Ying, Z. (Eds.). (2002). China's Transition to a Global Economy. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Zweig, D. (2002). Internationalizing China: Domestic Interests and Global Linkages. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
