Libertarian National Committee
Introduction
Regardless of an individual�s stance on the initial invasion of Iraq, it is now clear that
there is no end in sight to the sustained violence in the region. A commonsense
strategy for success is the first mandatory step to end this conflict.
After two years of American presence in Iraq it has become evident that there is no
military solution that will achieve peace within that country. The Libertarian Party,
along with supporting organizations and individuals, proposes this exit strategy for
use by the Bush administration � for the benefit of members of the armed forces,
for their families and for the people of Iraq.
The Invasion of Iraq
After September 11, 2001, the United States re-examined countries that could be
potential threats to national security. Iraq was considered a gathering threat by the
Bush administration. It was presented to the American public that Saddam Hussein
was actively reconstituting Iraq�s nuclear weapons program. Additionally, British
intelligence erroneously reported that �Saddam Hussein sought significant quantities
of uranium from Africa1.�
As another reason for war with Iraq, the Bush administration advertised that Iraq
was hiding stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons. Secretary of State Colin
Powell testified during a meeting of the United Nations Security Council that the
United States had obtained intelligence proving conclusively that Hussein was
actively producing weapons of mass destruction2.
In addition to the threat of weapons of mass destruction, members of the Bush
administration claimed that the Iraqi government had supported and protected Al
Qaeda terrorists. They asserted that terrorists who fled from fighting in Afghanistan
were hiding out in Iraq, with protection provided by Hussein�s government3.
In the final days before the invasion, President George W. Bush declared that Iraq
was in violation of United Nations disarmament resolutions. President Bush set a
deadline for Saddam Hussein to surrender his weapons of mass destruction and
subsequently disarm. It was made clear that if Saddam did not comply with all of the
U.N. resolutions, the U.S. would invade Iraq and remove him from power.
On March 19, 2003, the U.S. invasion of Iraq began with a massive bombing
campaign and a large ground invasion. The active campaign lasted forty-four days,
with an end to major combat operations announced by President Bush on May 1,
2003, aboard the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln.
The Continuing Occupation of Iraq
American and coalition troops have remained in Iraq for over two years since Bush's
declaration of victory. According to the Bush administration, the continued military
presence is needed to assist the new Iraqi government in providing security and
fighting the "insurgency." Supporters of the United States military's continued
occupation of Iraq refuse to announce a time for pulling out of the country. They
claim that if a timetable for removing troops is announced, the "insurgency" will
simply pull back, regroup, and wait until the deadline has passed to strike against
Iraq's fledgling government with even greater force � once the deterrent of an
occupying force has been removed.
"Timetables simply send the wrong message," White House Press Secretary Scott
McClellan has said. "They send the wrong message to the terrorists; they send the
wrong message to the Iraqi people. They send the wrong message to our troops who
are serving admirably and working to complete an important mission."4
Those who support the continued occupation of Iraq assume that those fighting
against U.S. forces in Iraq are the remnants of Saddam Hussein's regime and foreign
fighters who are working to prolong the conflict. They claim once American troops
withdraw, former Ba�ath Party members would attempt to overthrow the new Iraqi
government and once again to subjugate Iraq to a totalitarian regime. Because many
believe the U.S. military is being opposed on the ground by Islamic militants, the
United States is willing to accept nothing less than total victory, which at the current
moment remains undefined. In this scenario, the Bush administration argues a
withdrawal of U.S. troops will signal a victory for terrorists and a defeat in the War
on Terror.
The Libertarian Party refutes this argument. The so-called �insurgents� are primarily
Iraqis who have taken up arms against the occupying forces in order to protect
themselves and reclaim their nation. Evidence shows that the continuing American
military presence is, in fact, fueling the continued resistance by Iraqi citizens.
According to a report produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
those fighting are, in large part, those who have lost loved ones fighting U.S. forces.
They are driven by "the political and economic turmoil that accompanied the
occupation."5 The CSIS report refers to CIA reports that many of the "insurgents" are
newly radicalized Iraqi Sunnis � not remnants of the Ba'ath party. The Sunnis have
lost power both politically and economically during the U.S. occupation of Iraq, with
reports of Sunni unemployment soaring to 60 percent in many areas of the country.
While it is now evident that al-Qaeda members and other foreign terrorists have
moved onto Iraqi soil since the invasion, they represent only a small portion of the
insurgency and could be dealt with quickly by a competent Iraqi security force.
The U.S. military occupation is becoming increasingly unpopular with Iraqis. A recent
Zogby opinion poll in Iraq found that 82 percent of Sunnis and 69 percent of Shiites
were in favor of the withdrawal of American and coalition forces "either immediately
or after an elected government is in place."6 That poll was taken in January 2005.
While it is too late for U.S. troops to be withdrawn "immediately," elections for the
new Iraqi government have been accomplished, fulfilling the other condition.
Polls both in Iraq and in the United States have demonstrated that a majority of
citizens in each country want American troops to be pulled out of Iraq.
The strategy below takes into account the wishes of the Iraqi people, the history of
the Middle East, and the greater good of the United States. By withdrawing our
troops from harm�s way we are respecting Iraq as an independent, sovereign
country, not as an American protectorate.
Developing an Exit Strategy
With the continued loss of American life, the decline in troop morale, the ongoing
and exorbitant expenditure of American taxpayers� money, and with the declining
acceptance of the American presence by Iraqis, it has become necessary to develop
a sensible plan for troop withdrawal.
American military deaths are mounting. There was an increase in May 2005 of
American military casualties, to the highest monthly level since January of the same
year. In mid-June, the American death toll passed the 1,700 mark7. In addition, the
invasion and the resulting occupation have taken a great toll on Iraqi civilians. It has
been estimated at least 22,353 Iraqi civilians have been killed since the invasion by
U.S. troops8. Public support for the war is rapidly eroding. The American public is
now questioning whether invading Iraq was worthwhile. In a national
CNN/USA/Gallup poll conducted on May 3, 2005, 57 percent of those polled said they
did not believe it was worth going to war9. This was an increase of 7 percent from
February 2005.
Now is the time for the United States to initiate an exit strategy, as the main military
objectives have been accomplished. Saddam Hussein has been captured. He will be
tried for war crimes in an Iraqi court. Saddam Hussein�s government has been
overthrown, with many senior officials either captured or killed � including Hussein�s
sons, Uday and Qusay. A democratically elected, functional interim government is in
place. The new government has a sufficient military and police force to maintain
security, and training of new military and police forces continues. The longer the
United States has troops stationed in Iraq, the more we will be seen as occupiers and
not as liberators.
As costs for military operations in Iraq continue to escalate, an exit strategy with a
defined timetable for troop withdrawal will assist the Pentagon and the Bush
administration in projecting and controlling costs. Military operations in Iraq are
costing the United States about $5 billion per month10. We are unable to afford a
long, open-ended military commitment.
This proposed exit strategy should provide the basis for a reasoned, practical
solution to the current situation in Iraq. Taking a sober look at the situation, it is
evident there is no easy solution to reducing our presence in Iraq. Ensuring a stable,
democratic Iraqi government will not be accomplished without difficulty. Adherence
to this exit strategy will end the senseless deaths of American soldiers in Iraq,
ensure that Iraqi nationalists do not have an occupying force to oppose, help slow
the rapidly escalating cost to American taxpayers, and allow a successful end to the
conflict.
Iraq Exit Strategy: Troop Withdrawal
The first step is immediately to begin the withdrawal of all American troops from
Iraq. Currently American troop levels are at about 140,00011. Troops would leave
gradually, in increments of approximately 11,600 per month, resulting in a complete
withdrawal in one year�s time. This will bring the troops out of harm�s way quickly,
preventing more unnecessary loss of life. Allowing a year for the withdrawal will give
the Iraqi government time to train and deploy a sufficient security force in trouble
areas.
As the United States removes troops from Iraq, 30,000 will be relocated to other
Middle Eastern countries. Ten thousand troops will be placed in Afghanistan for
peacekeeping purposes. Decisions regarding troop reallocation will be based on the
locations of existing U.S. military bases in the Middle East. The most likely
candidates would be Turkey, Bahrain, Egypt and Oman. These countries were chosen
based on current foreign military base information in the Department of Defense
Base Structure Report12. All of the previously mentioned countries have U.S. military
bases that possess additional acres to house more troops. The remaining troops,
numbering approximately 100,000 would return home rather being relocated to
other Middle Eastern countries. This would help reduce the strain on military reserves
and free up military resources for the War on Terror.
Those against the immediate withdrawal of American troops believe an American
departure will create a significant power vacuum. They assert that Iraqi security
forces are ill-equipped to stand alone. It is feasible that, given a year for training,
the Iraqi security forces would be able to control the insurgency. As of January 2005,
the Iraqi Army had a total of 68 operating battalions which includes the Iraqi
National Guard that was incorporated into the Iraqi Army13. The Iraqi government
has its own Special Operation Forces, including a counter-terrorist force to combat
insurgents14. As of January 2005 there were approximately 55,000 trained Iraqi
police officers. Furthermore, there are five police academies that together train
approximately 3,500 police officers a month. Using these numbers, approximately
42,000 officers could be trained in one year, almost doubling their current numbers.
At the end of the troop withdrawal process, the Iraqi government could have 97,000
police officers trained and placed on the streets.
By removing our troops from Iraq and relocating them to various bases in the Middle
East, we remove the insurgency�s common enemy. The insurgency consists of many
different factions with no central leadership. One faction consists of leftover
remnants of the former regime, such as the Ba�ath party, Republican Guard and the
paramilitary Fida�iyin. A second faction consists of religious groups who wish to turn
Iraq into an Islamic state. Some of these groups are trained overseas or are foreign
nationals, the latter including Syrians, Saudis, Yemenis and Sudanese15. Another
faction is comprised of nationalist groups who oppose American troops being
stationed in Iraq and were against Saddam Hussein�s regime16. According to the
Strategic Studies Institute, most of the armed opposition has been Sunni17. Even
though major Sunni political parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Iraqi
Islamic Party are participating in the political process, many Sunni clerics have
strongly opposed the American military presence. �Without the occupation as an
outside enemy, those much smaller sectors of the resistance that are motivated
largely by religious extremism and who are responsible for some of the worst
violence against civilians, will likely become isolated from the broader sectors of the
resistance,� the Strategic Studies Institute authors noted18.
Negotiations with nationalist groups not tied to the former regime should take place
in tandem with the withdrawal of U.S. troops. �We are not going to win the
unconditional surrender from the insurgents and have no choice but to somehow
bring them into society,� said retired Army Colonel Paul Hughes, an Iraq war veteran
who is now at the government-funded U.S. Institute for Peace19. There is evidence
suggesting that these groups would consider surrendering in exchange for immediate
and complete U.S. withdrawal and major political concessions to the Sunnis20.
Removing the Sunni nationalist groups will help to isolate the more extreme
elements of the insurgency. Divisions between secular Iraqi insurgents and Muslim
extremists are becoming more evident; insurgents native to Iraq have denounced
the brutal tactics of the extremists21. It is hoped that a negotiated settlement with
the mainstream faction of the insurgency will help to further polarize the extremists.
Direct-Aid Program
After U.S. troop withdrawal begins, a direct-aid program will begin for the Iraqi
government. The U.S. government will disperse funds directly to the Iraqi
government to be used strictly for the creation of viable infrastructure. The Iraqi
government will exercise complete control over the spending of funds and the
contracting of projects. Giving Iraqis complete administrative and fiscal control over
rebuilding their infrastructure will allow them to tap into local �know-how� that only
Iraqis possess.
Safeguards will be put in place to ensure U.S. aid is spent efficiently and effectively.
Strict accounting guidelines promoting transparency and accountability must be in
place prior to the disbursement of aid. An independent third-party auditor must be
hired to perform an audit every six months until the program has ended. These
audits will be made available to Congress and to the American public. If fraud is
detected, aid monies will be withheld until the problem is corrected.
The Iraqi government will be required to choose and hire a private firm to perform
oversight on private contractors. The firm�s mission will be to ensure that all contract
work is completed in a timely and efficient manner and to prevent fraud, waste and
inefficiency. The overseeing firm will be required to furnish reports to the Iraqi and
American governments. Additionally, these reports will be available for full public
disclosure.
Even though the direct-aid program will be a substantial cost to American taxpayers,
the United States is now obligated to make sure Iraq becomes a stable, independent
and functional country. Substantial progress has been made in rebuilding the Iraqi
infrastructure, but this does not satisfy the need for additional aid. A conservative
estimate by USAID projects a total reconstruction expenditure of $150 billion22.
Based on current estimates, oil sales alone will not provide adequate funding for
reconstruction projects. A Centre for Global Energy Studies report states that if Iraq
were to pay all financial obligations without any outside assistance, the nation would
continue to run a deficit into 201623. Additionally, Iraq has not met the projected 2.5
million barrels per day (MBPD), with their average output in the second week of June
a 2.16 MBPD24. Iraq�s oil revenues for the entire year of 2004 were $18.1 billion25.
Iraq�s national debt is estimated to be between $119 to $135 billion before any debt
forgiveness has occurred, and the country owes an estimated $50 billion in war
reparations stemming from the 1991 Gulf War26. Many debt forgiveness initiatives
are already underway. Paris Club members have agreed to forgive a total of $42
billion of Iraq�s debt27. Iraq is still obligated to repay the Paris Club nations almost $8
billion28. The United States has agreed to forgive $4.5 billion of Iraq�s debt29. Other
countries will not provide debt relief until a freely elected government is in place. It
is still unclear whether or not Kuwait will forgive Iraq�s debt, estimated at $16 billion,
or the outstanding war reparations30. It is probable that, even with the institution of
debt-forgiveness programs, a direct aid program administered by the United States
will be required.
A direct aid program will give Iraq the best chance of becoming a stable, democratic,
free-market-oriented country. It is imperative that the Iraqi economy be fully
developed as quickly as possible. Vast, persistent unemployment would create a
fertile breeding ground for terrorists. The direct aid program will give Iraq vital
assistance while giving the Iraqi people, through their government, control over the
disbursement of funds. In previous successful postwar reconstructions, such as
Europe after World War II, the reconstructing governments managed the Marshall
Plan funds, not the United States31.
Conclusion
Our troops have completed their missions: the liberation of Iraq, the capture of
Saddam Hussein, and the provision of security for the January 30, 2005, elections.
American military personnel should be commended for accomplishing these difficult
tasks and performing them in a courageous and selfless manner. We cannot continue
to keep our servicemen and women committed to an open-ended, violent conflict in
Iraq. By removing our troops in an orderly and systematic fashion over the course of
one year, we will withdraw our troops on our terms while retaining the honor and
respect that they deserve. By creating a direct aid program for Iraq, we give them
the necessary funds to become an advanced, industrialized, democratic nation. By
giving the Iraqi government full control over the disbursement of aid funds, we
respect the wishes of the Iraqi people and foster the development of good diplomatic
relations. Our exit strategy will help to end the senseless loss of American and Iraqi
lives. It will ensure that Iraq is rebuilt in an efficient and expedient manner, at the
lowest possible cost to the American taxpayers.
Above all else, the intent of this proposed strategy is to remove our troops from
harm�s way and, in the near future, return them to their families � who have been
supportive through these trying times. Our hope is that the great loss of life seen by
both American and Iraqi families will give the Bush administration pause to consider
and deploy this strategy for eventual peace.
Attribution: Special thanks to the principal author, Matthew Dailey, for his diligent
research and dedication to this project. Additional thanks to Pere Garlinghouse, J.
Daniel Cloud, Sam New, Shane Cory and the entire staff at Libertarian Party
Headquarters for their contributions to this project and their ongoing dedication to
freedom.
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2005 from http://www.defendamerica.mil/downloads/MNFI-Year-in-Review_2004-Fact-Sheets.pdf.
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home and internationalize the peace. Retrieved June 13, 2005 from http://www.ipsdc.
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2005 from http://www.defendamerica.mil/downloads/MNFI-Year-in-Review_2004-Fact-Sheets.pdf.
26 U.S. Department of Defense (2005, January 21). Iraq year in review: 2004 fact sheet. Retrieved June 15,
2005 from http://www.defendamerica.mil/downloads/MNFI-Year-in-Review_2004-Fact-Sheets.pdf.
27 U.S. Department of Defense (2005, January 21). Iraq year in review: 2004 fact sheet. Retrieved June 15,
2005 from http://www.defendamerica.mil/downloads/MNFI-Year-in-Review_2004-Fact-Sheets.pdf
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29 U.S. Department of Defense (2005, January 21). Iraq year in review: 2004 fact sheet. Retrieved June 15,
2005 from http://www.defendamerica.mil/downloads/MNFI-Year-in-Review_2004-Fact-Sheets.pdf
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31 Heritage Foundation (2005, June 13). Winning the peace: Principles for post-conflict operations.
(Backgrounder No. 1859). Washington, DC: James J. Carafano and Dana R. Dillon.
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