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[quote]"You try to assert that this second statement requires "...person N feels it is objectively moral" which I must disagree with. For example, I believe that my morality makes me not want to sleep around prolifickly, or generally hang out with people that do. However, my own morality doesn't chastise people who do as bad or immoral. It's just not optimizing behavior for myself. My morality is my own, and I don't force it on others, and it is liable to change.
Really the whole concept of morality is weird to qualify. In the past there was a strong belief that god's imbued humanity with some set of morality, for which not taking moral action was punishable in some fashion. Or, that through good moral action would could attain things like inner piece. As we've kicked away those belief structures over time, what exactly is morality has kind of disappeared."[/quote]
[color=indigo]Your 're correct that your notions of morality are not simply a description of what you do and that it is maximally beneficial for you. The reason for that is your moral notions are actually a sentiment that a particular action must occur. You consider true that you must not sleep around prolifically. That the moral obligation applies only to yourself does not change that it is a notion of moral truth. An objective notion about appropriate behaviour, which is being applied to yourself. Do you ever consider that it is appropriate for you to sleep around prolifically? Or that it might be in your present state? I suspect not. In terms of the quality of truth, this is no different than claiming that everyone is morally obligated to perform some action. The difference is in WHO the truth is applying to. In the case of the moral notions you presented here, they apply only to what actions you perform, as opposed to what actions everyone must perform.
This results in a circumstance where the objective aspect of your moral notions become hidden. As a result of only applying the moral demand to yourself, the need to justify it becomes unnoticed, for there are not a horde of other people disagreeing and demanding you support your contentions of moral obligation.
This, however, does not eliminate the question of whether your nations if what you should be doing are accurate.
How do you know it is appropriate for you to behave in the manner you think you should? How do you justify that your notions of morality reflect what you should be doing? That you moral notions are only applying to yourself and liable to change does not eliminate this question. Without the moral notions you feel being reflected in truth(it is kind of redundant to say objective because all truth is objective), you have no case that your notions of what you should do are accurate. You moral notions are not simply an idea of what is maximally beneficial for yourself. It is the thought, in a given moment, that there is something is maximally beneficial for yourself AND it is true that it should occur.
It can seem that way. Now, since we recognise the range of how different individual's feel about morality, have a tendency to want contentions proven with empirical evidence and have a strong culture of individual freedom, the nature of moral truth appears highly dangerous. Moral truth is something that can but used to argue that people should give up individual freedom. It can be used in argument that we must dismiss an individual's feelings. And being entirely conceptual and necessarily axiomatic, one can never point to evidence showing that a moral truth must be(of course, that it is required to justify that individual freedom should be, that our individual projects should be or for us to have laws gets lost. This isn't really surprising though, as our society, at least on the service, already has those things. We don't need to appeal to moral truth to protect them under the present circumstances). What tends to happen is the feelings of an individual about moral truth g