Complex Systems

Complex Systems's avatar

Birthday: 01/03

Contact

  • Add to Friends
  • Send Message
  • Trade Items

Forums

Posts per Day: 2.34

Total Posts: 3236

Latest Posts

Recent Visitors

My Playlist

You currently have zero playlists!

 

About the a*****e

My name is Kevin Duncan, and I am a soon to be graduate student in Economics with a B.Sc in Economics and Public Policy from George Washington University. I've spent the past year working in the non-profit sector in Washington DC specifically on tax and regulatory policy at the GWU Regulatory Studies Center and the Tax Foundation.

My interests include computational macroeconomics, specifically in agent based modeling, developmental economics, industrial organization of small enterprises, and urban economics. I am interested in studying the response of firms and individuals to polycentric governance and policy.

I am also a large fan of 35mm photography (I use a 1970's Pentax Spotmatic with a variety of lenses, recently I've been pimping a 28mm wide angle), music (I play trumpet, bass, and guitar), and biking (ride a Marin bike to work almost every day, where I get to go by the Jefferson Memorial, the cherry blossoms, and the Washington monument). I've run a variety of blogs over the years, been a frequent poster in Gaia Metal Forums, and a resident geek in Extended Discussion - Politics.

Feel free to ask me about any of the above, or if you have any questions about life, economics, and philosophy.

Hate Mail

View All Comments

Ivan Schitz Report | 10/02/2012 8:48 am
Ivan Schitz
Thanks for attempting to inform my posters. I don't have the patience to type all of that out, I don't really want to go on there and lecture or write scholarly essays, I go on there sometimes hoping to have a conversation and I'm always disappointed.
The Willow Of Darkness Report | 06/10/2012 4:59 pm
The Willow Of Darkness
The justification is not subjective. You are claiming that "it is" the case that the given action is what you should be doing. This can't act as truth without being truth. You could make the argument that it is your position is your own position of morality rather than anyone else's, but this doesn't solve the problem. Why should it be your desires that define what is moral for you to do? In that situation, for there to be the justification for you position of morality, you still need to claim truth(which is objective): that your notions of morality set out the actions you should do.

On the contrary it matters a great deal. If what you say about there being no moral truth is true, then as our feelings about morality(that "it is" the case a given action should occur) do not reflect the reality, whether such a standard of action is referring to everyone or only ourselves, then our feelings our flawed and have no justification in reality. The very point our notions make, that "it is(true)" that a particular action should be performed is an empty one. Our very nature to seek what is of benefit to as goes against the reality of what is true. If you are still claiming a moral truth or thinking a moral truth has substance under these circumstances, you are going against the truth of reality. It is like knowing it it true that something doesn't exist and then going on to claim that it it does. Absurdity.

There is also a greater problem. How do you know that it is indeed the case that there is no truth of morality? What evidence do you have of this? Non-cognitivism actually makes an axiomatic claim about the nature of reality(that there is no coherent truth of morality). If whether or not moral was actually unknown, then you wouldn't be able to say that it didn't exist. You would have to take a position that we didn't know whether our notions of morality reflected a coherent truth in reality.
The Willow Of Darkness Report | 06/09/2012 4:06 pm
The Willow Of Darkness
How do you know it is appropriate for you to behave in the manner you think you should? How do you justify that your notions of morality reflect what you should be doing? That you moral notions are only applying to yourself and liable to change does not eliminate this question. Without the moral notions you feel being reflected in truth(it is kind of redundant to say objective because all truth is objective), you have no case that your notions of what you should do are accurate. You moral notions are not simply an idea of what is maximally beneficial for yourself. It is the thought, in a given moment, that there is something is maximally beneficial for yourself AND it is true that it should occur.

It can seem that way. Now, since we recognise the range of how different individual's feel about morality, have a tendency to want contentions proven with empirical evidence and have a strong culture of individual freedom, the nature of moral truth appears highly dangerous. Moral truth is something that can but used to argue that people should give up individual freedom. It can be used in argument that we must dismiss an individual's feelings. And being entirely conceptual and necessarily axiomatic, one can never point to evidence showing that a moral truth must be(of course, that it is required to justify that individual freedom should be, that our individual projects should be or for us to have laws gets lost. This isn't really surprising though, as our society, at least on the service, already has those things. We don't need to appeal to moral truth to protect them under the present circumstances). What tends to happen is the feelings of an individual about moral truth get presented as the nature of moral truth.

This is not true. An argument that says: “It is true X should happen” is not equivalent to saying: “It is true that I feel X should happen.” While the latter is also there in the case of the former, the former is not the claim of the latter.

Of course, you can argue that moral truth is not coherent. That there is no moral truth which can be reflected in an argument, but that simply means that the contentions of moral truth do not reflect reality, as opposed to changing the contentions so they are no longer one of moral truth.
The Willow Of Darkness Report | 06/09/2012 4:05 pm
The Willow Of Darkness
Bleh, let's try that again(I'm not sure what happened. I think I ran out of space).


Your 're correct that your notions of morality are not simply a description of what you do and that it is maximally beneficial for you. The reason for that is your moral notions are actually a sentiment that a particular action must occur. You consider true that you must not sleep around prolifically. That the moral obligation applies only to yourself does not change that it is a notion of moral truth. An objective notion about appropriate behaviour, which is being applied to yourself. Do you ever consider that it is appropriate for you to sleep around prolifically? Or that it might be in your present state? I suspect not. In terms of the quality of truth, this is no different than claiming that everyone is morally obligated to perform some action. The difference is in WHO the truth is applying to. In the case of the moral notions you presented here, they apply only to what actions you perform, as opposed to what actions everyone must perform.

This results in a circumstance where the objective aspect of your moral notions become hidden. As a result of only applying the moral demand to yourself, the need to justify it becomes unnoticed, for there are not a horde of other people disagreeing and demanding you support your contentions of moral obligation.

This, however, does not eliminate the question of whether your nations if what you should be doing are accurate.

The Willow Of Darkness Report | 06/09/2012 4:01 pm
The Willow Of Darkness
[quote]"You try to assert that this second statement requires "...person N feels it is objectively moral" which I must disagree with. For example, I believe that my morality makes me not want to sleep around prolifickly, or generally hang out with people that do. However, my own morality doesn't chastise people who do as bad or immoral. It's just not optimizing behavior for myself. My morality is my own, and I don't force it on others, and it is liable to change.


Really the whole concept of morality is weird to qualify. In the past there was a strong belief that god's imbued humanity with some set of morality, for which not taking moral action was punishable in some fashion. Or, that through good moral action would could attain things like inner piece. As we've kicked away those belief structures over time, what exactly is morality has kind of disappeared."[/quote]

[color=indigo]Your 're correct that your notions of morality are not simply a description of what you do and that it is maximally beneficial for you. The reason for that is your moral notions are actually a sentiment that a particular action must occur. You consider true that you must not sleep around prolifically. That the moral obligation applies only to yourself does not change that it is a notion of moral truth. An objective notion about appropriate behaviour, which is being applied to yourself. Do you ever consider that it is appropriate for you to sleep around prolifically? Or that it might be in your present state? I suspect not. In terms of the quality of truth, this is no different than claiming that everyone is morally obligated to perform some action. The difference is in WHO the truth is applying to. In the case of the moral notions you presented here, they apply only to what actions you perform, as opposed to what actions everyone must perform.

This results in a circumstance where the objective aspect of your moral notions become hidden. As a result of only applying the moral demand to yourself, the need to justify it becomes unnoticed, for there are not a horde of other people disagreeing and demanding you support your contentions of moral obligation.

This, however, does not eliminate the question of whether your nations if what you should be doing are accurate.

How do you know it is appropriate for you to behave in the manner you think you should? How do you justify that your notions of morality reflect what you should be doing? That you moral notions are only applying to yourself and liable to change does not eliminate this question. Without the moral notions you feel being reflected in truth(it is kind of redundant to say objective because all truth is objective), you have no case that your notions of what you should do are accurate. You moral notions are not simply an idea of what is maximally beneficial for yourself. It is the thought, in a given moment, that there is something is maximally beneficial for yourself AND it is true that it should occur.

It can seem that way. Now, since we recognise the range of how different individual's feel about morality, have a tendency to want contentions proven with empirical evidence and have a strong culture of individual freedom, the nature of moral truth appears highly dangerous. Moral truth is something that can but used to argue that people should give up individual freedom. It can be used in argument that we must dismiss an individual's feelings. And being entirely conceptual and necessarily axiomatic, one can never point to evidence showing that a moral truth must be(of course, that it is required to justify that individual freedom should be, that our individual projects should be or for us to have laws gets lost. This isn't really surprising though, as our society, at least on the service, already has those things. We don't need to appeal to moral truth to protect them under the present circumstances). What tends to happen is the feelings of an individual about moral truth g
The Willow Of Darkness Report | 06/08/2012 4:02 pm
The Willow Of Darkness
Which means on such a situation as moral truth(as claimed by the person positing the moral proposition), not that there exists subjective moral truth.

To say there is subjective moral truth mistakenly collapses the category of truth that justifies action( X is moral, and what is claimed when some takes a position of morality) into the one of what someone feels(in someone's subjectivity, they feel X is objectively moral).

The Willow Of Darkness Report | 06/08/2012 4:48 am
The Willow Of Darkness
Evolutionary game approach is a explanation of moral behaviour. It isn't an explanation of whether something is morally justified. It analysis the methods by which people act and why they do so. It does not actually justify that any action is morally correct(which is the point of a position of moral truth).
The Willow Of Darkness Report | 06/08/2012 4:43 am
The Willow Of Darkness
That is what the problem is. You are repeating the error of the person in the thread(at least you seem to be). A notion of morality held by us is not actually a personal position. It is a proposition that the personal(what someone feels is moral) reflects a truth of reality about what is moral. The point our positions of morality is that the one given argument is correct and other positions are nonsense. If I argue it is moral for me to sit on a particular chair, I am making an argument that it is true that I should sit on the chair, justifying that it that action that must happen. This cannot become "subjective," as it loses any power to demand action if that happens. If it is not the case that such an action must happen, if at any point it is not true, then I don't have support for my moral position. My argument would become in your terms R(x) -> M(x) when also R(x) -> ~ M(x). Nonsense. It also no longer serves what I mean, as it does not justify the action i claim to be justified. Any moral argument made by someone is actually R(x) -> M(x) when R(x) -> ~ M(x) and ~R(x) -> M(x) are untrue. Moral truth cannot be subjectively true(what people feel is moral most certainly can, but that is not moral truth).

I was addressing, in the thread, what is required for morals to to be accurate. If accuracy is to occur "R(x) -> M(x) when R(x) -> ~ M(x) and ~R(x) -> M(x) are untrue." must be the case. If this isn't morality cannot be accurate and it renders notions of morality nothing but our feelings that do not reflect any coherent truth(i.e. Non-cognitivism).

This is why the person in the thread is in error. If they are to make the argument that objective morality does not exist, they are making the argument there is no such thing as moral truth, not that there are many subjective truths of morality(there is objective truth of what each individual person feels is moral within their subjectivity, but that is a truth of what people feel, not of morals).
The Willow Of Darkness Report | 06/08/2012 12:03 am
The Willow Of Darkness
*registering*

This isn't really an issue when dealing with a given symbolic argument itself, as under that circumstance, it is taken that the person making the argument is not going to make an error in transfer an argument to symbolic logic. It is, however, an issue if a discussion is in words. The particular issue I was dealing with was someone making an incoherent argument, in this instance, that a notion of moral truth, as in truth itself, is created by feelings(which cannot be, as the quality of truth is tautological as "being." If there is a notion of moral truth, it is a notion that the given standard IS justified action). Here the difference between a proposal and truth itself becomes important, as someone may propose an argument that is incoherent. [ /color]
The Willow Of Darkness Report | 06/07/2012 4:14 pm
The Willow Of Darkness
Yes, in transferring words into expressions, the nature of truth itself becomes hidden.

If we turn "The apple is round" in symbolic logic, by taking "is" means the predication then given it an expression, what "is" actually means when truth occurs becomes hidden. The logic of analytic philosophy collapses predication of a concept( "The apple is round" )and the truth of a concept( "It is true the apples round" ) into one, by not reregistering that there is a difference between making the suggestion an apple is round and the statement of "The apple is round" when referring to truth that the apples is round.

Hate Mail

M.Sc PhD student in Economics
5 more years!