I Refute Berkeley Thus
Common sense isn't evidence. These terms are meant to be unpacked and analyzed, not taken at face-value.
Except that it's not useful to do so, and leads to the same problem as most other philosophies of thought: that you must, at some point, admit to a "just-so" and assume an unprovable.
In the case of "the past," our frame of reference forces this, at the point where
observation causes memory of an observation. This causation is one you already accept: after all, you cannot remember the sound that the tree made when it fell, if you didn't hear it.
However, you say that memories (being a present artifact) cannot be used as evidence of the past. We can take this a short step further and say that a memory is not evidence of its antecedent observation.
Thus,
every time you rely on your memories, you are assuming that those memories have antecedents, despite the antecedents not existing in this world. When you confirm a guess, you are not just deciding whether your observation agrees with a memory of a guess, you are assuming that you ever made a guess, and using your memory of it as an anchor for that assumption.
Because speed is a change in position over time, using the ball's speed to predict its future position is likewise making several assumptions:
-That your memory of each position of the ball closer to me corresponds to an observation of this, despite the ball being halfway between us;
-That, collectively, your memory of the several positions forms a pattern;
-That this pattern will continue into "future" moments, in such a way that you can consciously react.
You don't think about this process most of the time. I'd guess that most of us hardly ever, IF ever, think about it this way. But as you can see, you make the same assumptions as everyone else. To reject them leaves no reason to accept causation or motion.