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Ban's avatar

Jeering Regular

I Refute Berkeley Thus
Justification, however, is a notoriously subjective, vague, and I think, somewhat bullshit, inclusion in the definition of knowledge. I'm not sure in what sense you could genuinely believe something and believe that you were not justified in doing so.
What does it mean to "genuinely" believe something? You stated earlier that you believed your roommate was in his room, but at the same time stated that there was a possibility he slipped out. Was that a genuine belief? Wouldn't possibility that your roommate did not stay in the last place you saw him or would expect him to be mean your belief was just an unjustified assumption?

I Refute Berkeley Thus
This would seem to go back to the delusion case, where the person is merely being contradictory or inconsistent.
People do all sorts of things they might know they are not justified in, whatever the standard of justification. Why should belief be different from any other human activity? People get drunk, even though they shouldn't. People cheat on their significant others, and feel guilty about it. People eat junk food, even though they know they're supposed to watching their cholesterol. Behaviors can be consciously inconsistent, without necessarily being insane. Delusional implies lack of volition, that we cannot help that our perceptions and beliefs are abnormal, contradictory, or divorced from reality. I'd argue that delusion is just what we do anyway, but without any ability to control it.
Ban
What does it mean to "genuinely" believe something? You stated earlier that you believed your roommate was in his room, but at the same time stated that there was a possibility he slipped out. Was that a genuine belief? Wouldn't possibility that your roommate did not stay in the last place you saw him or would expect him to be mean your belief was just an unjustified assumption?


Beliefs admit of degree.

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I Refute Berkeley Thus
This would seem to go back to the delusion case, where the person is merely being contradictory or inconsistent.
People do all sorts of things they might know they are not justified in, whatever the standard of justification. Why should belief be different from any other human activity? People get drunk, even though they shouldn't. People cheat on their significant others, and feel guilty about it. People eat junk food, even though they know they're supposed to watching their cholesterol. Behaviors can be consciously inconsistent, without necessarily being insane. Delusional implies lack of volition, that we cannot help that our perceptions and beliefs are abnormal, contradictory, or divorced from reality. I'd argue that delusion is just what we do anyway, but without any ability to control it.


I wasn't ware that agnostic theism was supposed to be an inherently inconsistent position.

Also, I don't think that "weakness of will" or doing things you "know" are wrong makes any sense. If you knew they were wrong, you wouldn't do them. The heuristic for a cheater is cheating, not "feeling guilty" about cheating. If they didn't want to cheat, they wouldn't have - clearly they did want to, because they did.
Ban's avatar

Jeering Regular

I Refute Berkeley Thus
Beliefs admit of degree.
Doesn't that contradict your argument that beliefs mean you think something is true? Truth is a binary. Things are either true or false. If you're not sure, then you don't think it's true. Maybe it just "feels" true? That is, you can be of two minds about something?

I Refute Berkeley Thus
I wasn't ware that agnostic theism was supposed to be an inherently inconsistent position.
Well, I didn't say inconsistent. I would say irrational. But, then I'm kind of an existentialist, so I don't necessarily see a problem with that.

I Refute Berkeley Thus
Also, I don't think that "weakness of will" or doing things you "know" are wrong makes any sense. If you knew they were wrong, you wouldn't do them. The heuristic for a cheater is cheating, not "feeling guilty" about cheating. If they didn't want to cheat, they wouldn't have - clearly they did want to, because they did.
Is desire the same thing as being justified in fulfilling your desire? If so, it sounds like morality and self-control is out the window. People can hold multiple motivations, some logical, some not.

You seem to think the self is monolithic, a black box. Our actions indicate some sort of singular process. I think basic neurobiology experiments would show that is not the case. We confabulate. We do things and then come up with an explanation for why we did them. The split-brain experiments are an example.
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Doesn't that contradict your argument that beliefs mean you think something is true? Truth is a binary. Things are either true or false. If you're not sure, then you don't think it's true. Maybe it just "feels" true? That is, you can be of two minds about something?


The bolded is debatable, but also irrelevant. The point is that someone can think that something is true to a greater or lesser extent. Do you really think that you only think things are true with 100% certainty or none at all?

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Well, I didn't say inconsistent. I would say irrational. But, then I'm kind of an existentialist, so I don't necessarily see a problem with that.


Then the two axes are still not needed, if the beliefs they describe are mere irrationalities. These could be derivative of the one axis, still.

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Is desire the same thing as being justified in fulfilling your desire? If so, it sounds like morality and self-control is out the window. People can hold multiple motivations, some logical, some not.

You seem to think the self is monolithic, a black box. Our actions indicate some sort of singular process. I think basic neurobiology experiments would show that is not the case. We confabulate. We do things and then come up with an explanation for why we did them. The split-brain experiments are an example.


Nowhere did I say that. I simply think that the idea that someone can know that something is wrong and do it anyway is nonsense. To the extent that they did it, clearly they didn't know, otherwise they wouldn't have. What inconsistencies the person may have in their thought process or morality is irrelevant - these would only serve to further the point that they did not know in any substantial sense.
Ban's avatar

Jeering Regular

I Refute Berkeley Thus
The bolded is debatable, but also irrelevant. The point is that someone can think that something is true to a greater or lesser extent. Do you really think that you only think things are true with 100% certainty or none at all?
Not addressing my point, or we're talking past each other. I was making the point that certainty, which just appears to be the level at which you yourself consider your belief justified (correctly or not), indicates that there is some percentage at which you are not willing to claim knowledge. However, your response was to say that a differing level of certainty was a different level of belief.

So, what does that mean? That you think something is 50% true? That you can 50% think something? Neither particularly makes sense. Something is true or not true. You either think something or you don't.

I Refute Berkeley Thus
Then the two axes are still not needed, if the beliefs they describe are mere irrationalities. These could be derivative of the one axis, still.
Why not? It is one of the more important irrational things people believe in.

I Refute Berkeley Thus
Nowhere did I say that. I simply think that the idea that someone can know that something is wrong and do it anyway is nonsense. To the extent that they did it, clearly they didn't know, otherwise they wouldn't have.
Knowledge does not necessitate action. One can intentionally do wrong.
Ban
Not addressing my point, or we're talking past each other. I was making the point that certainty, which just appears to be the level at which you yourself consider your belief justified (correctly or not),


Things can be more or less certain. If you believe something, ipso facto you think yourself justified in believing to the extent that you believe. Differences in justification versus belief only enter into the picture when we leave the realm of a single person's subjective opinion.

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So, what does that mean? That you think something is 50% true? That you can 50% think something? Neither particularly makes sense. Something is true or not true. You either think something or you don't.


You can be more or less sure that something is true, not sure that it is more or less true. Again, you can be more convinced of some things than others - this should be obvious.

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Why not? It is one of the more important irrational things people believe in.


The irrationality would be better captured by showing that it exists as an inconsistency on a single axis. The double axis, as I understand it, was to set out the difference between four legitimate, consistent positions.

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Knowledge does not necessitate action. One can intentionally do wrong.


One cannot intentionally do what one thinks is wrong. If you thought it was wrong, you wouldn't have done it.
I Refute Berkeley Thus
Ban
Knowledge does not necessitate action. One can intentionally do wrong.


One cannot intentionally do what one thinks is wrong. If you thought it was wrong, you wouldn't have done it.


Wrong relative to what?
Fermionic
I Refute Berkeley Thus
Ban
Knowledge does not necessitate action. One can intentionally do wrong.


One cannot intentionally do what one thinks is wrong. If you thought it was wrong, you wouldn't have done it.


Wrong relative to what?


In this case, relative to what the agent thinks is wrong. If the agent thought it was wrong, he/she wouldn't do it (freely).
I Refute Berkeley Thus
Fermionic
I Refute Berkeley Thus
Ban
Knowledge does not necessitate action. One can intentionally do wrong.


One cannot intentionally do what one thinks is wrong. If you thought it was wrong, you wouldn't have done it.


Wrong relative to what?


In this case, relative to what the agent thinks is wrong. If the agent thought it was wrong, he/she wouldn't do it (freely).


No; as in, morally wrong, factually wrong, contextually wrong...?
Fermionic
I Refute Berkeley Thus
Fermionic
I Refute Berkeley Thus
Ban
Knowledge does not necessitate action. One can intentionally do wrong.


One cannot intentionally do what one thinks is wrong. If you thought it was wrong, you wouldn't have done it.


Wrong relative to what?


In this case, relative to what the agent thinks is wrong. If the agent thought it was wrong, he/she wouldn't do it (freely).


No; as in, morally wrong, factually wrong, contextually wrong...?


You could make the same point for action towards what is morally wrong or belief/assent towards what is factually wrong, though I think the fact-value gap is questionable. It works in either case, regardless. I don't know what you mean by "contextually wrong."
Ban's avatar

Jeering Regular

I Refute Berkeley Thus
Things can be more or less certain. If you believe something, ipso facto you think yourself justified in believing to the extent that you believe. Differences in justification versus belief only enter into the picture when we leave the realm of a single person's subjective opinion.
I don't think this idea of "the extent that you believe" is really valid. You believe something or you don't. The language you use of how "sure" you are just appears to be a self-evaluation of how justified the belief is. It may be a subjective opinion of how justified you are, but that hasn't been a problem, as far as I can tell. You have been throwing around subjective claims of knowledge and truth, despite these existing outside subjective opinion.

I Refute Berkeley Thus
You can be more or less sure that something is true, not sure that it is more or less true. Again, you can be more convinced of some things than others - this should be obvious.
Yeah, that sounds like an evaluation of the belief, not the belief itself.

I Refute Berkeley Thus
The irrationality would be better captured by showing that it exists as an inconsistency on a single axis. The double axis, as I understand it, was to set out the difference between four legitimate, consistent positions.
Depends on what you consider legitimate.

I Refute Berkeley Thus
One cannot intentionally do what one thinks is wrong. If you thought it was wrong, you wouldn't have done it.
I get the feeling you've never been to Vegas.
Ban
I don't think this idea of "the extent that you believe" is really valid. You believe something or you don't.


This is simply not a tenable position. I'm not even sure how a person could function if belief were binary. It would be a very confusing life, to say the least - absolute conviction and indifference/conviction in the opposite direction? When your position is taking you this far off track, you know something's wrong.

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I get the feeling you've never been to Vegas.


People go to Vegas because they want to indulge. They then - surprise - indulge. What is the sense of saying "I chose to do something, but I didn't want to?" If you didn't want to, you wouldn't have done it (if there is no coercion present).
Ban's avatar

Jeering Regular

I Refute Berkeley Thus
This is simply not a tenable position. I'm not even sure how a person could function if belief were binary. It would be a very confusing life, to say the least - absolute conviction and indifference/conviction in the opposite direction? When your position is taking you this far off track, you know something's wrong.
I'm not saying absolute conviction. I'm rejecting that conviction is part and parcel of the statement of the belief. They are separable elements. The belief itself is the statement "it is true that P." You either make that statement or you don't. The question, having made it, how certain you are it is correct, is another matter.

There's no "degree of belief." There are degrees of conviction about beliefs, which amount to subjective valuations of the belief's justification.

I Refute Berkeley Thus
People go to Vegas because they want to indulge. They then - surprise - indulge. What is the sense of saying "I chose to do something, but I didn't want to?" If you didn't want to, you wouldn't have done it (if there is no coercion present).
The statement isn't "I chose to do something, but I didn't want to," but "I chose to do something I shouldn't have done." Which is pretty much what indulgence is.
Xiam's avatar

Anxious Humorist

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Fermionic
I Refute Berkeley Thus
Fermionic
I Refute Berkeley Thus
Ban
Knowledge does not necessitate action. One can intentionally do wrong.


One cannot intentionally do what one thinks is wrong. If you thought it was wrong, you wouldn't have done it.


Wrong relative to what?


In this case, relative to what the agent thinks is wrong. If the agent thought it was wrong, he/she wouldn't do it (freely).


No; as in, morally wrong, factually wrong, contextually wrong...?

Factually wrong? What, so like... thinking they can fly?
Lord Balmung of Azure Sky's avatar

Phantom

Xiam
Fermionic
I Refute Berkeley Thus
Fermionic
I Refute Berkeley Thus
Ban
Knowledge does not necessitate action. One can intentionally do wrong.


One cannot intentionally do what one thinks is wrong. If you thought it was wrong, you wouldn't have done it.


Wrong relative to what?


In this case, relative to what the agent thinks is wrong. If the agent thought it was wrong, he/she wouldn't do it (freely).


No; as in, morally wrong, factually wrong, contextually wrong...?

Factually wrong? What, so like... thinking they can fly?

I can fly. Prove me wrong.

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