The Twin Axes of Atheism/Theism-Gnostic/Agnostic Are Fake

[The Willow Of Darkness]

False Dichotomy

Xiam

I Refute Berkeley Thus

The Twin Axes of Atheism/Theism-Gnostic/Agnostic Are Fake

I wouldn't say "fake," but... perhaps "misguided" would be the right word.

I'm not really going to say there's one axis, either. I always consider religious opinions to be like a cloud, or various clouds blending together. Think about it like clusters of lights. Stars, or something. And each one burns a different color depending on their opinions.

Now, some burn brightly, and very solid colors of particular sorts. These are the ones with the most conviction, the most certainty that what they believe is right. Then there are others, who burn faintly, and perhaps shift from color to color. They're uncertain, wavering, unable to hold down a conviction, because they honestly don't know what to believe.

You cannot state that these faint, multicolor stars are blue, or green, or red, or yellow, or white, or any other color. They're vague and impossible to classify. These are agnostics.

Meanwhile, we may have people who burn brightly, but still shift colors. Or people who burn faintly, but stick to their colors. Again, it's all very difficult to pin down, and you can't simply make two or four extremes and plot them out between them.

There's a human urge to see patterns and divide things into categories, or define rules for the way things go or should go. But we can't deny that there will always be exceptions.

Congratulations for being the first here to say this. I'll just stick to a simple "Yea, he's right" and end it here.

He is correct, but that is a function Atheism/Theism-Gnostic/Agnostic not accurately describing the beliefs that many people hold, as opposed to their being something wrong with the belief knowledge separation.

[I Refute Berkeley Thus]

The Willow Of Darkness

I Refute Berkeley Thus

The Willow Of Darkness

I Refute Berkeley Thus

The Willow Of Darkness

They think their beliefs reflect reality. They do not KNOW that they do. That is where the difference is. To use the bear suit example, if I was to see you in a bear suit, I would then KNOW that you were wearing a bear suit, confirming that my claim to knowledge(that you are wasting a bear suit) is indeed accurate to reality.

Yes, some beliefs are stronger than others. So what? If it's a matter of degree, this still exists on one axis.

This isn't a matter degrees. Different degrees of belief doesn't make sense: a belief is by definition the holding that a particular positions is true. This cannot be done be degrees. Something cannot be "half true" or any fraction of truth. When it appears that it is, an entirely different proposition is present and a different belief is being held.

The difference in between the two positions is actually being created by the introduction of knowledge that confirms that a belief is accurate to reality. The change in the state of the knowledge axis is the difference between the two situations of belief.

Quote:

Different degrees of belief doesn't make sense

confused

Yes. If you are talking about whether someone believes X is true, the following make no sense:

"I believe X 150% true". Either one is just adding feeling to the fact they believe it, most likely for an effect of achieving an ethical goal(i.e. "THIS IS SUPER TRUE. YOU REALLY SHOULD BELIEVE IT) or they are expressing belief for the position X+1/2X is true instead of X.

"I believe X is 50% true." Either one is expressing a stance of uncertainty about X being true(in which case the belief is X is true 50% of the time and not actually X) or they are expressing that 1/2X is true(in which case that have a brief in 1/2 X and not X).

I believe some things more strongly than others; you're wrong.

[I Refute Berkeley Thus]

False Dichotomy

I Refute Berkeley Thus

False Dichotomy

I Refute Berkeley Thus

False Dichotomy

If you think you know, you're a gnostic, not an agnostic. An agnostic does not know, and does not claim to know.

Uncertainty exists, deal with it.

Uncertainty is equally a lack of belief as it is a lack of a claim to knowledge. Thus, there is still only one axis, not two.

I believe in God. I am not certain god exists.

I believe I am not in the matrix. I do not know for sure the matrix does not exist. Belief has little to do with knowledge, only that things you claim to know you usually believe. It is not strictly true in the reverse direction.

How does this show that there are two axes? Being certain would just move you farther along the axis towards theism. You seem to be treating "knowledge" as a state of certainty, which would make it the endpoint of one axis.

Let's assume the situation applies to unicorns here.

You can assume 4 things:

Unicorns are real, and it can be/has been proven.
Unicorns are real, but it cannot be proven.
Unicorns are fake, but it cannot be proven.
Unicorns are fake, and it can be/has been proven.

Now, here, belief in unicorns has nothing to do with belief that unicorns can be proven. Disbelief in unicorns has even less to do with whether or not you think it can be proven.

Why should you make what is two distinct beliefs one scale? The truth of the matter is that you can believe four things, but they aren't the same:

Unicorns are real
Unicorns are fake
Unicorns can be proven to exist/~exist
Unicorns cannot be proven to exist/~exist

These four beliefs don't seem to reflect the four quadrants of the scale we're discussing.

It would be more like:

I believe unicorns are real, and I know that they are.
I believe unicorns are real, but I don't know that they are.

etc., etc.

[The Willow Of Darkness]

I Refute Berkeley Thus

The Willow Of Darkness

I Refute Berkeley Thus

The Willow Of Darkness

I Refute Berkeley Thus

Yes, some beliefs are stronger than others. So what? If it's a matter of degree, this still exists on one axis.

This isn't a matter degrees. Different degrees of belief doesn't make sense: a belief is by definition the holding that a particular positions is true. This cannot be done be degrees. Something cannot be "half true" or any fraction of truth. When it appears that it is, an entirely different proposition is present and a different belief is being held.

The difference in between the two positions is actually being created by the introduction of knowledge that confirms that a belief is accurate to reality. The change in the state of the knowledge axis is the difference between the two situations of belief.

Quote:

Different degrees of belief doesn't make sense

confused

Yes. If you are talking about whether someone believes X is true, the following make no sense:

"I believe X 150% true". Either one is just adding feeling to the fact they believe it, most likely for an effect of achieving an ethical goal(i.e. "THIS IS SUPER TRUE. YOU REALLY SHOULD BELIEVE IT) or they are expressing belief for the position X+1/2X is true instead of X.

"I believe X is 50% true." Either one is expressing a stance of uncertainty about X being true(in which case the belief is X is true 50% of the time and not actually X) or they are expressing that 1/2X is true(in which case that have a brief in 1/2 X and not X).

I believe some things more strongly than others; you're wrong.

You probably do, but not in the way you are proposing, as it is nonsensical.

Can you give us an example of what you have a stung belief in and what you have a weak belief in?

[I Refute Berkeley Thus]

The Willow Of Darkness

I Refute Berkeley Thus

The Willow Of Darkness

I Refute Berkeley Thus

The Willow Of Darkness

This isn't a matter degrees. Different degrees of belief doesn't make sense: a belief is by definition the holding that a particular positions is true. This cannot be done be degrees. Something cannot be "half true" or any fraction of truth. When it appears that it is, an entirely different proposition is present and a different belief is being held.

The difference in between the two positions is actually being created by the introduction of knowledge that confirms that a belief is accurate to reality. The change in the state of the knowledge axis is the difference between the two situations of belief.

Quote:

Different degrees of belief doesn't make sense

confused

Yes. If you are talking about whether someone believes X is true, the following make no sense:

"I believe X 150% true". Either one is just adding feeling to the fact they believe it, most likely for an effect of achieving an ethical goal(i.e. "THIS IS SUPER TRUE. YOU REALLY SHOULD BELIEVE IT) or they are expressing belief for the position X+1/2X is true instead of X.

"I believe X is 50% true." Either one is expressing a stance of uncertainty about X being true(in which case the belief is X is true 50% of the time and not actually X) or they are expressing that 1/2X is true(in which case that have a brief in 1/2 X and not X).

I believe some things more strongly than others; you're wrong.

You probably do, but not in the way you are proposing, as it is nonsensical.

Can you give us an example?

I believe I'm in my room, and I believe my roommate's in his. But I'm slightly more sure that I'm in mine, since the probability that my roommate slipped out without me noticing is greater from my perspective than that I myself am actually not where I think I am at this moment.

Pretty simple, really.

[The Willow Of Darkness]

I Refute Berkeley Thus

The Willow Of Darkness

I Refute Berkeley Thus

The Willow Of Darkness

I Refute Berkeley Thus

confused

Yes. If you are talking about whether someone believes X is true, the following make no sense:

"I believe X 150% true". Either one is just adding feeling to the fact they believe it, most likely for an effect of achieving an ethical goal(i.e. "THIS IS SUPER TRUE. YOU REALLY SHOULD BELIEVE IT) or they are expressing belief for the position X+1/2X is true instead of X.

"I believe X is 50% true." Either one is expressing a stance of uncertainty about X being true(in which case the belief is X is true 50% of the time and not actually X) or they are expressing that 1/2X is true(in which case that have a brief in 1/2 X and not X).

I believe some things more strongly than others; you're wrong.

You probably do, but not in the way you are proposing, as it is nonsensical.

Can you give us an example?

I believe I'm in my room, and I believe my roommate's in his. But I'm slightly more sure that I'm in mine, since the probability that my roommate slipped out without me noticing is greater from my perspective than that I myself am actually not where I think I am at this moment.

Pretty simple, really.

What is your reasoning for that the probability of you not being where you think you are is greater than you noticing your roommate slipping out?

[Tuah]

p = p;

NullReferenceException()

[I Refute Berkeley Thus]

The Willow Of Darkness

I Refute Berkeley Thus

The Willow Of Darkness

I Refute Berkeley Thus

The Willow Of Darkness

I Refute Berkeley Thus

confused

Yes. If you are talking about whether someone believes X is true, the following make no sense:

"I believe X 150% true". Either one is just adding feeling to the fact they believe it, most likely for an effect of achieving an ethical goal(i.e. "THIS IS SUPER TRUE. YOU REALLY SHOULD BELIEVE IT) or they are expressing belief for the position X+1/2X is true instead of X.

"I believe X is 50% true." Either one is expressing a stance of uncertainty about X being true(in which case the belief is X is true 50% of the time and not actually X) or they are expressing that 1/2X is true(in which case that have a brief in 1/2 X and not X).

I believe some things more strongly than others; you're wrong.

You probably do, but not in the way you are proposing, as it is nonsensical.

Can you give us an example?

I believe I'm in my room, and I believe my roommate's in his. But I'm slightly more sure that I'm in mine, since the probability that my roommate slipped out without me noticing is greater from my perspective than that I myself am actually not where I think I am at this moment.

Pretty simple, really.

What is your reasoning for that the probability of you not being where you think you are is greater than you noticing your roommate slipping out?

Why does it matter? Even if there were no reasoning, it's still the case that one belief is stronger than the other.

[The Willow Of Darkness]

I Refute Berkeley Thus

False Dichotomy

I Refute Berkeley Thus

False Dichotomy

I Refute Berkeley Thus

False Dichotomy

If you think you know, you're a gnostic, not an agnostic. An agnostic does not know, and does not claim to know.

Uncertainty exists, deal with it.

Uncertainty is equally a lack of belief as it is a lack of a claim to knowledge. Thus, there is still only one axis, not two.

I believe in God. I am not certain god exists.

I believe I am not in the matrix. I do not know for sure the matrix does not exist. Belief has little to do with knowledge, only that things you claim to know you usually believe. It is not strictly true in the reverse direction.

How does this show that there are two axes? Being certain would just move you farther along the axis towards theism. You seem to be treating "knowledge" as a state of certainty, which would make it the endpoint of one axis.

Let's assume the situation applies to unicorns here.

You can assume 4 things:

Unicorns are real, and it can be/has been proven.
Unicorns are real, but it cannot be proven.
Unicorns are fake, but it cannot be proven.
Unicorns are fake, and it can be/has been proven.

Now, here, belief in unicorns has nothing to do with belief that unicorns can be proven. Disbelief in unicorns has even less to do with whether or not you think it can be proven.

Why should you make what is two distinct beliefs one scale? The truth of the matter is that you can believe four things, but they aren't the same:

Unicorns are real
Unicorns are fake
Unicorns can be proven to exist/~exist
Unicorns cannot be proven to exist/~exist

These four beliefs don't seem to reflect the four quadrants of the scale we're discussing.

It would be more like:

I believe unicorns are real, and I know that they are.
I believe unicorns are real, but I don't know that they are.

etc., etc.

The "knowledge" in the belief/knowledge separation is knowledge confirming that belief reflects reality: proof is what it is all about.

[I Refute Berkeley Thus]

The Willow Of Darkness

I Refute Berkeley Thus

False Dichotomy

I Refute Berkeley Thus

False Dichotomy

I believe in God. I am not certain god exists.

I believe I am not in the matrix. I do not know for sure the matrix does not exist. Belief has little to do with knowledge, only that things you claim to know you usually believe. It is not strictly true in the reverse direction.

How does this show that there are two axes? Being certain would just move you farther along the axis towards theism. You seem to be treating "knowledge" as a state of certainty, which would make it the endpoint of one axis.

Let's assume the situation applies to unicorns here.

You can assume 4 things:

Unicorns are real, and it can be/has been proven.
Unicorns are real, but it cannot be proven.
Unicorns are fake, but it cannot be proven.
Unicorns are fake, and it can be/has been proven.

Now, here, belief in unicorns has nothing to do with belief that unicorns can be proven. Disbelief in unicorns has even less to do with whether or not you think it can be proven.

Why should you make what is two distinct beliefs one scale? The truth of the matter is that you can believe four things, but they aren't the same:

Unicorns are real
Unicorns are fake
Unicorns can be proven to exist/~exist
Unicorns cannot be proven to exist/~exist

These four beliefs don't seem to reflect the four quadrants of the scale we're discussing.

It would be more like:

I believe unicorns are real, and I know that they are.
I believe unicorns are real, but I don't know that they are.

etc., etc.

The "knowledge" in the belief/knowledge separation is knowledge confirming that belief reflects reality: proof is what it is all about.

Again, proof is irrelevant; all that matters is whether the person thinks that there is proof (or some weaker justification). And in this respect belief and claim to knowledge are the same. One who thins he has proof both believes and thinks he knows, and one who has no inclination whatsoever both does not believe and does not think he knows.

[The Willow Of Darkness]

I Refute Berkeley Thus

The Willow Of Darkness

I Refute Berkeley Thus

The Willow Of Darkness

I Refute Berkeley Thus

I believe some things more strongly than others; you're wrong.

You probably do, but not in the way you are proposing, as it is nonsensical.

Can you give us an example?

I believe I'm in my room, and I believe my roommate's in his. But I'm slightly more sure that I'm in mine, since the probability that my roommate slipped out without me noticing is greater from my perspective than that I myself am actually not where I think I am at this moment.

Pretty simple, really.

What is your reasoning for that the probability of you not being where you think you are is greater than you noticing your roommate slipping out?

Why does it matter? Even if there were no reasoning, it's still the case that one belief is stronger than the other.

It is important to the question.

If, for example, one is stronger because you have observed how you perception works and and proven it is likely to miss someone working out of the room if you are concentrating on anything else, then you have used the knowledge axis to define your belief(you believe what you do because you now it is confirmed as correct).

If, on the other hand, you were simply to feel that it was not as likely that you were to see you roommate move if you were concentrating on something else, then there is no use of the knowledge axis.

Whether or not you use the knowledge axis might not make any difference to the strength of your belief. One could feel just as strongly that one thing was more likely than another without having the proof and using the knowledge axis. Then again, one might not. It might be, if used, the confirmation of the knowledge axis that makes you take the belief that you do.

For example, if you claimed that you had ten billon dollars, most people would likely not believe you because the evidence is that not many people have ten billion dollars. However, if you were to show them that you possessed ten billion dollars, they would likely believe you. The role of the knowledge axis, proof, is really about defining people's beliefs as opposed to them being uncertain about them.

[The Willow Of Darkness]

I Refute Berkeley Thus

The Willow Of Darkness

I Refute Berkeley Thus

False Dichotomy

I Refute Berkeley Thus

False Dichotomy

I believe in God. I am not certain god exists.

I believe I am not in the matrix. I do not know for sure the matrix does not exist. Belief has little to do with knowledge, only that things you claim to know you usually believe. It is not strictly true in the reverse direction.

How does this show that there are two axes? Being certain would just move you farther along the axis towards theism. You seem to be treating "knowledge" as a state of certainty, which would make it the endpoint of one axis.

Let's assume the situation applies to unicorns here.

You can assume 4 things:

Unicorns are real, and it can be/has been proven.
Unicorns are real, but it cannot be proven.
Unicorns are fake, but it cannot be proven.
Unicorns are fake, and it can be/has been proven.

Now, here, belief in unicorns has nothing to do with belief that unicorns can be proven. Disbelief in unicorns has even less to do with whether or not you think it can be proven.

Why should you make what is two distinct beliefs one scale? The truth of the matter is that you can believe four things, but they aren't the same:

Unicorns are real
Unicorns are fake
Unicorns can be proven to exist/~exist
Unicorns cannot be proven to exist/~exist

These four beliefs don't seem to reflect the four quadrants of the scale we're discussing.

It would be more like:

I believe unicorns are real, and I know that they are.
I believe unicorns are real, but I don't know that they are.

etc., etc.

The "knowledge" in the belief/knowledge separation is knowledge confirming that belief reflects reality: proof is what it is all about.

Again, proof is irrelevant; all that matters is whether the person thinks that there is proof (or some weaker justification). And in this respect belief and claim to knowledge are the same. One who thins he has proof both believes and thinks he knows, and one who has no inclination whatsoever both does not believe and does not think he knows.

That is the thing though: not all people professing a belief think they have proof. They, of course, think that there position is definitely true, but they can also point out that they do not have proof for what they claim. They are not the same. Even when someone does claim proof, and has proof, they are not the same. There is still the belief(the stance of the person), the claim of proof(a claim that their stance is confirmed to reflect reality) and the proof itself(that the evidence that shows the claim of proof to be true is present).

Furthermore, not everyone who claims to have proof has it, so it is important to mark when proof is actually present for accuracy, else the difference between proven claims and claims which are falsely said to be proven disappears.

[Ban]

I Refute Berkeley Thus

If I believe P, then I think that P is true.
If I think that P is true, then I believe P.

Therefore, I believe P iff I think that P is true.

If I think that I know P, then I think that P is true.
If I think that P is true, then I think that I know P.

Any proposition P can can be preceded by a statement of the veracity of the proposition and be logically the same. Knowledge can arguably be replaced as a belief that is justified and true.

First two statements restated, if I believe it is true that P, then I think it is true that P. This essentially seems to state that believing is both necessary and sufficient for believing. Indeed they are arguably equal to each. Believing something is true is the same thing as thinking something is true.

Third statement restated: if I believe it is true that I have a justified, true belief that it is true that P, therefore I believe that it is true that P. This follows logically from the unpacked language. The inverse, however, does not logically follow, and you have yet to give a reason why it should.

Cool story though.

[I Refute Berkeley Thus]

Ban

Third statement restated: if I believe it is true that I have a justified, true belief that it is true that P, therefore I believe that it is true that P. This follows logically from the unpacked language. The inverse, however, does not logically follow, and you have yet to give a reason why it should.

The issue would have to hinge on justification, since the belief is there by definition and truth would seem to be required in the willingness to state that P.

Justification, however, is a notoriously subjective, vague, and I think, somewhat bullshit, inclusion in the definition of knowledge. I'm not sure in what sense you could genuinely believe something and believe that you were not justified in doing so. This would seem to go back to the delusion case, where the person is merely being contradictory or inconsistent.

"I believe that P, but I'm not justified in believing P."

But surely the point is not that the double axis is meant to map delusional positions.

[Fermionic]

Knowledge =/= Thinking you know.