Critical Rationalism: Knowledge Without Justification?

[Nerdologist]

Karl Popper's rationalist philosophy, known as critical rationalism, takes a nonjustificationist approach to epistemology in order to avoid difficulties in the justificationist approach, such as the Munchhausen Trilemma. Instead of resorting to foundationalism, coherentism, or infinitism, critical rationalists subject every claim to criticism in order to assess its likelihood relative to other claims. While critical rationalism holds that one ought never stop criticizing positions, this does not lead to an infinite regress. Justificationists, on the other hand, can never completely verify what they believe they know because an infinite series of justifications would be required to do so.

My question is, how do critical rationalists think one can get closer to the truth and/or gain knowledge? I understand that they think falsifiable theories with high empirical content which have withstood the most intense scrutiny are the best supported, but how do they determine that these theories best reflect a mind-independent reality (when compared with less successful theories)?

[Amarok Anernerk]

Philosophy. A love of wisdom. A love of something one does not know and has not yet achieved. And yet every philosopher assumes it is something lovely. That is the Socratic paradox. If one must question everything, must they not question the will to question? Hence metaphilosophy: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphilosophy

In response to your question it may be that critical rationalists aren't trying to find the truth, but are instead aiming to propel themselves as far as they can from lies. Negative reinforcment. Not positive. A slap on the flank instead of a carrot in the face. If in so doing they become closer to the truth, then well and good. But that is not their core motive.

[Nerdologist]

Amarok Anernerk

Philosophy. A love of wisdom. A love of something one does not know and has not yet achieved. And yet every philosopher assumes it is something lovely. That is the Socratic paradox. If one must question everything, must they not question the will to question? Hence metaphilosophy: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphilosophy

I'm trying to figure out how this relates to my topic. Are you suggesting that critical rationalism is paradoxical due to its self-referential nature? Philosophers have argued that the central principle of critical rationalism, that all positions are criticizable, leads to semantical paradoxes. See the following passage from W. W. Bartley's essay "A Refutation of the Alleged Refutation of Comprehensively Critical Rationalism."

Quote:

Take the following two claims:
(A) All positions are open to criticism.
(B) A is open to criticism.
Since (B) is implied by (A), any criticism of (B) will constitute a criticism of (A), and thus show that (A) is open to criticism. Assuming that a criticism of (B) argues that (B) is false, we may argue: if (B) is false, then (A) is false; but an argument showing (A) to be false (and thus criticizing it) shows (B) to be true. Thus, if (B) is false, then (B) is true. Any attempt to criticize (B) demonstrates (B); thus (B) is uncriticizable, and (A) is false.

Is that what you were getting at? If so, solutions to paradoxes such as this have been proposed involving object languages and metalanguages.

[Amarok Anernerk]

Well actually I usually find paradoxes to be indicative of the failings of language and communication moreso than a philosophical failing. One might say that it is good to question every thing, but in saying as much, turns the concept into a thing - because that is what language was invented for. To define and objectify so that a thought can transfer from the mind of one into that of another. Thus when you speak of anti-concepts like skepticism and critical rationalism you are swimming upstream against the purpose of language. It's like mixing unstable chemicals and the paradox is the explosion.

But that doesn't make critical rationalism wrong. It only means that communication, like every other human invention, is not perfect.

[Nerdologist]

Amarok Anernerk

Well actually I usually find paradoxes to be indicative of the failings of language and communication moreso than a philosophical failing. One might say that it is good to question every thing, but in saying as much, turns the concept into a thing - because that is what language was invented for. To define and objectify so that a thought can transfer from the mind of one into that of another. Thus when you speak of anti-concepts like skepticism and critical rationalism you are swimming upstream against the purpose of language. It's like mixing unstable chemicals and the paradox is the explosion.

Can you define anti-concept? Are you using Ayn Rand's terminology?

Amarok Anernerk

But that doesn't make critical rationalism wrong. It only means that communication, like every other human invention, is not perfect.

Exactly.

[Amarok Anernerk]

Quote:

Can you define anti-concept?

I think clearly defining it would defeat its purpose. I suppose I could say that rather than being declarative ideas like x is y, the sole purpose of an anti-concept as I mean it is to challenge delcarative ideas. I can give you examples and you can deduce from there. Skepticism is an anti-concept because it centers around the questioning of affirmative knowledge. Cynicism is an anti-concept because it challenges any claim of affirmative morality. Post-modernism can be considered the mother of all anti-concepts because it seeks to dethrone the gilded propriety and scientism of the early 20th century.

[xavierkiath]

I know I'm punching outside my weight-class here because I don't know a few words in the opening post xp but I'd still like to try a metaphor and see what you think. Think of false information as a fire. It throws up smoke and ash making it impossible to know what is there, to see reality. If by falsifying everything you can, you put out the lies, whatever remains that could have been falsified and wasn't must be the truth. So a mind-independent reality is then made up of everything you can't currently prove false despite having falsifiable conditions. Let me know if that seems useful or if I'm not catching on to what you are asking.

[Samadhi23]

Fun topic; please tolerate the multi-layered aspect.

"My question is, how do critical rationalists think one can get closer to the truth and/or gain knowledge?"
Most commonly, it seems to be due to an axiomatic assumption that just because something is more probable, it is more likely to be the truth. Perhaps I am biased because that is the primary hole I see in that type of analysis, which isn't to say that I don't use it constantly however.
The difference seems to stem from the dogmatism through which the theory is applied combined with the application. I can be rather supportive of critical rationalism when undertaken as a thought exercise to qualitatively evaluate a subject where quantitative data is not applicable. I become more critical when the conclusions reached are moved towards axiomatic status themselves. Although this is held in theory as a principle to be avoided, in practice it often seems more lightly applied so as to avoid the potential value of some form of infinite regression.

"I understand that they think falsifiable theories with high empirical content which have withstood the most intense scrutiny are the best supported, but how do they determine that these theories best reflect a mind-independent reality (when compared with less successful theories)?"
Flat bias is the only idea that really comes to mind here. IMO, critical rationalism is far more valuable in a mind-dependent reality, so I certainly see the impetus for the question. But to argue for that perspective momentarily, I will need to include a slight psychological detour (apologies).

If we look at a psychological model of evolving intelligence, then it is easy to imagine some of the first couple steps. 1 Survival (fight or flight mechanism) 2 Emotional (pack bonding) 3 Intellectual (what we are doing right here) and proceeding to Social, Religious, and others. The important thing to note is the frequency with which we can verify these types of intelligence appear. Survival mechanisms are displayed from lower invertebrates and is the first noticeable in infants. Emotional are less common, but still more common than the next stage above it. This template continues.
So let's observe this model through the lens of critical rationalism. Since the Survival mechanism is chronologically primary, most inherent, and most basic, there is a strong argument to be made of legitimate primacy of that reality. And what is that reality concerned with? The direct experience of physical reality. As such, the conclusion of mind-independent reality seems like a foregone conclusion. Although I don't necessarily agree, I do find this argument highly internally consistent, and difficult to counter without rejecting the lens itself.

If we go back to the psychological model of intelligence for a moment, then another thing emerges if we remove the focus from the most numerically significant. There is a general human arrogance towards higher levels of intelligence supplanting lower levels. A mother might have a fight or flight Survival response in a closed box scenario, but this Survival response could easily get trumped by an Emotional response if her child was there. Similarly, if advanced enough, the mother also might trump the Emotional response by an intellectual one, by seeing that the panic of her emotional state is preventing the analysis of the situation which will best enable escape. This template continues.
With this lens in place, our concern most definitely becomes divorced from the numerical. So bringing this connection back to your original question now yields a distinct area to analyze. What bias is most common amongst critical rationalists? What is the highest consistent level of intelligence and, perhaps more importantly, focus? I would say unequivocally, the Intellectual level. So in conclusion and eventually getting to the answer to your question, I would place the Intellectual focus of the critical rationalists as the reason for them bending primarily towards mind-independent realities. Since this is how the Intellectual brand of intelligence works, this is the natural conclusion for that particular demographic of critical rationalists.

Hopefully I got that all out both organized and concise enough to be understandable biggrin


[Sidenote: This method of exploring bias actually had an interesting analog in the psychological field itself. Namely, in looking at the increased diagnosis of "anti-authoritarian" types of psychological disorders. It was exploring the idea that, since psychologists must go through extensive and heavily rigorous schooling to become certified, the field naturally draws people more submissive in nature that are willing to go through that type of ordeal. In addition, those outside that box tend to be forced into it by faculty, slow conditioning of how to succeed in the field; or are weeded out entirely. The end result concludes that since psychiatrists are significantly more likely to be submissive, they are also significantly more likely to diagnosis aggression and similar opposing biases as a disorder than a trait.]

[ArcaneEldritchNeurons]

Theories assuming less require less evidence, as such even if we were in the matrix one couldnt prove we were most likely, and the laws of physics as dictated by the matrix in this instance wouldnt change, and as such learning those laws to produce technology still benefits us in said matrix, so extending it to include said matrix would be pointless, a waste of time.

If this is relevant to a mind dependent reality or whatever.

[Nerdologist]

xavierkiath

I know I'm punching outside my weight-class here because I don't know a few words in the opening post xp but I'd still like to try a metaphor and see what you think. Think of false information as a fire. It throws up smoke and ash making it impossible to know what is there, to see reality. If by falsifying everything you can, you put out the lies, whatever remains that could have been falsified and wasn't must be the truth. So a mind-independent reality is then made up of everything you can't currently prove false despite having falsifiable conditions. Let me know if that seems useful or if I'm not catching on to what you are asking.

I thought falsification could only tentatively discredit an idea, not prove it to be false. How can a nonjustificationist (someone who doesn't believe that a proposition can be logically/deductively justified) believe in proof?

[xavierkiath]

Nerdologist

xavierkiath

I know I'm punching outside my weight-class here because I don't know a few words in the opening post xp but I'd still like to try a metaphor and see what you think. Think of false information as a fire. It throws up smoke and ash making it impossible to know what is there, to see reality. If by falsifying everything you can, you put out the lies, whatever remains that could have been falsified and wasn't must be the truth. So a mind-independent reality is then made up of everything you can't currently prove false despite having falsifiable conditions. Let me know if that seems useful or if I'm not catching on to what you are asking.

I thought falsification could only tentatively discredit an idea, not prove it to be false. How can a nonjustificationist (someone who doesn't believe that a proposition can be logically/deductively justified) believe in proof?

The proof isn't built through logic or deduction, it's made by observation. To my understanding, critical rationalism attempts to make every possible falsifiable statement, then check the highest content statements. If that statement is not part of a mind-independent reality, it will be observably false. Statements that survive observation should accurately reflect a mind-independent reality. It's not that the remaining statements are best supported, you don't ever try to support them. They just describe reality until you find something that shows the statement is false. As to how knowledge is gained, the same answer. Make a statement, then try to observe anything that might prove it false. If you cannot observe that it is false, it is accepted as knowledge, but still open to being shown false by later observations. Just my understanding of it. Thoughts?

[Nerdologist]

xavierkiath

Nerdologist

xavierkiath

I know I'm punching outside my weight-class here because I don't know a few words in the opening post xp but I'd still like to try a metaphor and see what you think. Think of false information as a fire. It throws up smoke and ash making it impossible to know what is there, to see reality. If by falsifying everything you can, you put out the lies, whatever remains that could have been falsified and wasn't must be the truth. So a mind-independent reality is then made up of everything you can't currently prove false despite having falsifiable conditions. Let me know if that seems useful or if I'm not catching on to what you are asking.

I thought falsification could only tentatively discredit an idea, not prove it to be false. How can a nonjustificationist (someone who doesn't believe that a proposition can be logically/deductively justified) believe in proof?

The proof isn't built through logic or deduction, it's made by observation. To my understanding, critical rationalism attempts to make every possible falsifiable statement, then check the highest content statements. If that statement is not part of a mind-independent reality, it will be observably false. Statements that survive observation should accurately reflect a mind-independent reality. It's not that the remaining statements are best supported, you don't ever try to support them. They just describe reality until you find something that shows the statement is false. As to how knowledge is gained, the same answer. Make a statement, then try to observe anything that might prove it false. If you cannot observe that it is false, it is accepted as knowledge, but still open to being shown false by later observations. Just my understanding of it. Thoughts?

To claim that an observation proves that a statement is inconsistent with a mind-independent reality is to assume that observations accurately represent said reality, and to deduce that any statement which conflicts with observation also conflicts with reality. But what if the world we observe is mind-dependent?

[xavierkiath]

Nerdologist

To claim that an observation proves that a statement is inconsistent with a mind-independent reality is to assume that observations accurately represent said reality, and to deduce that any statement which conflicts with observation also conflicts with reality. But what if the world we observe is mind-dependent?

A mind-dependent world would be differently observed by different minds. If you accept the existence of minds outside your own, comparison of observations can detect mind-dependent aspects of reality.

[Lady Vizsla]

That's a really good question but how can anyone reach a mind-independent conclusion outside their own biases?

[Nerdologist]

xavierkiath

Nerdologist

To claim that an observation proves that a statement is inconsistent with a mind-independent reality is to assume that observations accurately represent said reality, and to deduce that any statement which conflicts with observation also conflicts with reality. But what if the world we observe is mind-dependent?

A mind-dependent world would be differently observed by different minds. If you accept the existence of minds outside your own, comparison of observations can detect mind-dependent aspects of reality.

There's no reason to assume that different minds would dream up different worlds, especially considering the possibility that all minds are part of one universal mind. However, if it could be demonstrated that different minds observed different worlds, it could be concluded that the worlds were mind-dependent to some extent. (Although I suppose one of the worlds could be mind-independent, or more than one if multiple worlds could somehow exist at the same time)

Why would a critical rationalist accept the existence of minds outside his own? Is that a falsifiable hypothesis?