Atheism-belief that there is no God. What's wrong with that?

[I Refute Berkeley Thus]

Ban

Suppose someone has an irrational fear of flying. They've had nightmares about dying in a plane crash. This person is not delusional, does not doubt the statistical unlikelihood of something going wrong, and does not assert any rational reason to assume that if they step on a plane, something will go wrong during the flight. Nonetheless, they believe, to the point of having panic attacks at the thought of flying, that air travel would be the death of them. Can this person be said to either have knowledge or be making a knowledge claim?

Sounds like question begging to me. This reads to me like:

(1) There is a person who doesn't believe that flying is dangerous.
(2) But, suppose they do believe flying is dangerous.

If they really think that flying won't hurt them, I don't see in what sense they really "believe" it will. People can have conflicting behaviors, and delusions are interesting cases of a no-man's land between belief and unbelief, but that doesn't mean we magically get two axes out of it - it's just a weird case of the one.

Another way of putting this is that both belief and claims to knowledge can be substituted salva veritate with "think."

If you believe in God, you think God exists. If you claim to know God exists, you think God exists, and vice-versa in both cases. So, there is only one parameter - whether something thinks God exists, and how strong their conviction is.

[Ban]

I Refute Berkeley Thus

Sounds like question begging to me. This reads to me like:

(1) There is a person who doesn't believe that flying is dangerous.
(2) But, suppose they do believe flying is dangerous.

Where did I say that they didn't believe? My point was that irrational beliefs exist, and people can be aware of this, and thus a belief does not necessarily entail a knowledge claim.

I Refute Berkeley Thus

If they really think that flying won't hurt them, I don't see in what sense they really "believe" it will. People can have conflicting behaviors, and delusions are interesting cases of a no-man's land between belief and unbelief, but that doesn't mean we magically get two axes out of it - it's just a weird case of the one.

I didn't say they didn't think flying wouldn't hurt them. Just that they were conscious that these thoughts were not based in knowledge. Our point of disagreement isn't about belief, but about the knowledge.

I Refute Berkeley Thus

If you believe in God, you think God exists. If you claim to know God exists, you think God exists, and vice-versa in both cases.

I disagree with the third statement. Thinking something does not entail a knowledge claim. Without demonstrating that is always true, as my point about phobias and conscious irrational beliefs was getting at, your logical argument falls apart.

[I Refute Berkeley Thus]

Ban

Where did I say that they didn't believe? My point was that irrational beliefs exist, and people can be aware of this, and thus a belief does not necessarily entail a knowledge claim.

You didn't, but the argument is circular in that anyone inclined to reject the conclusion will on the same grounds be inclined to reject the premises. You gave a description of what I consider belief, and then one of unbelief, and so the example breaks down for someone not already convinced of your position.

Quote:

I didn't say they didn't think flying wouldn't hurt them. Just that they were conscious that these thoughts were not based in knowledge. Our point of disagreement isn't about belief, but about the knowledge.

Again, belief is the same as a claim to knowledge, or the "subjective aspect" of knowledge.

Quote:

I disagree with the third statement. Thinking something does not entail a knowledge claim. Without demonstrating that is always true, as my point about phobias and conscious irrational beliefs was getting at, your logical argument falls apart.

How can you think something is true without also thinking that you know it? If you think that you don't know, it what sense do you actually think it's true?

"P, but I don't know that P." It's a performative contradiction. You can have many levels of assurance, from a hunch to a conviction, but the extent to which you are confident in asserting P is the extent to which you believe it to be true, which is the extent to which you think you know P.

You are impaling yourself on Moore's Paradox:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moore's_paradox

[Ban]

I Refute Berkeley Thus

You didn't, but the argument is circular in that anyone inclined to reject the conclusion will on the same grounds be inclined to reject the premises. You gave a description of what I consider belief, and then one of unbelief, and so the example breaks down for someone not already convinced of your position.

It stops being belief if it lacks a knowledge claim? How do you characterize those arguments made by existentialists, agnostics, and so forth, that knowledge claims are impossible or fundamentally flawed? Do you think they don't believe things, simply because they consciously reject certainty as a meaningful concept?

I Refute Berkeley Thus

Again, belief is the same as a claim to knowledge, or the "subjective aspect" of knowledge.

I haven't seen this convincingly argued.

I Refute Berkeley Thus

How can you think something is true without also thinking that you know it?

By being uncertain. I might say, in a common situation, that I think the train is on time, without actually claiming that to know that it is on time. Inductive logic involves a lot of this. I might draw a conclusion from provided information while nonetheless being aware that I might be wrong, either do to a lack of complete information

I Refute Berkeley Thus

If you think that you don't know, it what sense do you actually think it's true?

Because despite lacking complete certainty, it may nonetheless be reasonable to assume a body of evidence pointing to a conclusion is reliable.

I Refute Berkeley Thus

"P, but I don't know that P." It's a performative contradiction.

You're ******** up Moore's Paradox. Moore's Paradox is more accurately stated as "P, but I don't believe P." Your statement, assuming the definition of knowledge as a "justified true belief" is just a straight up "A and not-A" contradiction, because any logical assertion is not an assertion of belief but of truth.

Realizing that is also how you solve the Liar's Paradox, bee tee dubs.

I Refute Berkeley Thus

You can have many levels of assurance, from a hunch to a conviction, but the extent to which you are confident in asserting P is the extent to which you believe it to be true, which is the extent to which you think you know P.

A knowledge claim requires an assertion of truth, because, as you yourself pointed out, knowledge presupposes truth. If your level of assurance does not rise to the point where you, individually, desire to make a truth claim, then how can a knowledge claim exist?

[I Refute Berkeley Thus]

Ban

It stops being belief if it lacks a knowledge claim? How do you characterize those arguments made by existentialists, agnostics, and so forth, that knowledge claims are impossible or fundamentally flawed? Do you think they don't believe things, simply because they consciously reject certainty as a meaningful concept?

It would be contradictory to say that knowledge of a subject was impossible and then have a belief regarding it, yes. You would to the extent you have such a belief be making a knowledge claim.

Quote:

By being uncertain. I might say, in a common situation, that I think the train is on time, without actually claiming that to know that it is on time. Inductive logic involves a lot of this. I might draw a conclusion from provided information while nonetheless being aware that I might be wrong, either do to a lack of complete information

I've already said belief admits of degree.

Quote:

You're ******** up Moore's Paradox. Moore's Paradox is more accurately stated as "P, but I don't believe P."

"I believe that P, but not-P."

Hmm.

Quote:

Your statement, assuming the definition of knowledge as a "justified true belief" is just a straight up "A and not-A" contradiction, because any logical assertion is not an assertion of belief but of truth.

No, you're denying the antecedent.

Quote:

A knowledge claim requires an assertion of truth, because, as you yourself pointed out, knowledge presupposes truth. If your level of assurance does not rise to the point where you, individually, desire to make a truth claim, then how can a knowledge claim exist?

The extent to which you have assurance is the extent to which you are making a truth claim - or is that somehow controversial? That seems to be what assurance is.

[The Willow Of Darkness]

I Refute Berkeley Thus

The Willow Of Darkness

I Refute Berkeley Thus

Look, people - a belief is the same as a claim to knowledge. You can be more or less convinced of things. That's it. No compasses necessary - this isn't that hard.

That is wrong. One can, for example, believe that something is a certain way without actually knowing that it is. For example, I can believe that you are wearing bear suit without actually knowing that you are.

This is because "know" is a factive verb that presupposes the truth of its complement.

What I said is that the extent to which one believes something is the same extent to which one claims to know something, and these positions include claims to knowledge, not knowledge itself (otherwise there could not simultaneously exist these different positions).

If you think you have no knowledge of something whatsoever, in what sense do you believe it? Sounds like playing with words, to me.

Ah I see. The difference here is between conceptual knowledge and whether that the object of that knowledge actually exists in the world. In this instance, "knowledge" is knowledge that the conceived object, say the entity of a deity, exists as an object in the world, as apposed to "knowledge" awareness of the concept.

In the example of my last post, there is the conceptual notion of you existing wearing a bear suit, which I have, allowing me to take a position of belief that it is true you are wearing a bear suit. I haven't actually confirmed this is right though; I have not actually observed that bodily entity that holds your mind wearing a bear suit, so I lack the knowledge of whether you are actually wearing a bear suit and that my belief is reflective of reality.

[The Willow Of Darkness]

I Refute Berkeley Thus

Ban

Where did I say that they didn't believe? My point was that irrational beliefs exist, and people can be aware of this, and thus a belief does not necessarily entail a knowledge claim.

You didn't, but the argument is circular in that anyone inclined to reject the conclusion will on the same grounds be inclined to reject the premises. You gave a description of what I consider belief, and then one of unbelief, and so the example breaks down for someone not already convinced of your position.

The axiom you are taking about the nature of belief and knowledge is mistaken. That is why this is occurring.

[I Refute Berkeley Thus]

The Willow Of Darkness

I Refute Berkeley Thus

The Willow Of Darkness

I Refute Berkeley Thus

Look, people - a belief is the same as a claim to knowledge. You can be more or less convinced of things. That's it. No compasses necessary - this isn't that hard.

That is wrong. One can, for example, believe that something is a certain way without actually knowing that it is. For example, I can believe that you are wearing bear suit without actually knowing that you are.

This is because "know" is a factive verb that presupposes the truth of its complement.

What I said is that the extent to which one believes something is the same extent to which one claims to know something, and these positions include claims to knowledge, not knowledge itself (otherwise there could not simultaneously exist these different positions).

If you think you have no knowledge of something whatsoever, in what sense do you believe it? Sounds like playing with words, to me.

Ah I see. The difference here is between conceptual knowledge and whether that the object of that knowledge actually exists in the world. In this instance, "knowledge" is knowledge that the conceived object, say the entity of a deity, exists as an object in the world, as apposed to "knowledge" awareness of the concept.

In the example of my last post, there is the conceptual notion of you existing wearing a bear suit, which I have, allowing me to take a position of belief that it is true you are wearing a bear suit. I haven't actually confirmed this is right though; I have not actually observed that bodily entity that holds your mind wearing a bear suit, so I lack the knowledge of whether you are actually wearing a bear suit and that my belief is reflective of reality.

If you believe that I am wearing a bear suit, then you think that I am wearing a bear suit, which is the same thing as thinking that you know I am, or making a knowledge claim.

To the extent you do not believe, you also do not think that you know.

I'm baffled that such a simple topic can cause so much confusion.

[I Refute Berkeley Thus]

"I believe P, but P is false."

Is this a performative contradiction or not?

Believing something is thinking that it's true. But, thinking that something is true is a claim to knowledge.

[The Willow Of Darkness]

I Refute Berkeley Thus

Ban

Suppose someone has an irrational fear of flying. They've had nightmares about dying in a plane crash. This person is not delusional, does not doubt the statistical unlikelihood of something going wrong, and does not assert any rational reason to assume that if they step on a plane, something will go wrong during the flight. Nonetheless, they believe, to the point of having panic attacks at the thought of flying, that air travel would be the death of them. Can this person be said to either have knowledge or be making a knowledge claim?

Sounds like question begging to me. This reads to me like:

(1) There is a person who doesn't believe that flying is dangerous.
(2) But, suppose they do believe flying is dangerous.

If they really think that flying won't hurt them, I don't see in what sense they really "believe" it will. People can have conflicting behaviors, and delusions are interesting cases of a no-man's land between belief and unbelief, but that doesn't mean we magically get two axes out of it - it's just a weird case of the one.

Another way of putting this is that both belief and claims to knowledge can be substituted salva veritate with "think."

If you believe in God, you think God exists. If you claim to know God exists, you think God exists, and vice-versa in both cases. So, there is only one parameter - whether something thinks God exists, and how strong their conviction is.

Ban's example here doesn't quite work as it should because he involved "dangerous," in number one, which is a concept that it tied to ethical considerations, which can never be separated from knowledge and belief when actually held.

Accurately stated, the example should involve:

(1) A person who has the knowledge, the conception, that they are unlikely to be involved in a crash, so there is little risk in flying(i.e. if they were to fly, the chance that flight were to be involved in a crash is low).

(2) This person has a fear of flying; they feel it is inevitable that the plane will crash, believing, contrary to the knowledge they have about the chance of the plane crashing, that it is a given the plane will crash.

[I Refute Berkeley Thus]

The Willow Of Darkness

I Refute Berkeley Thus

Ban

Suppose someone has an irrational fear of flying. They've had nightmares about dying in a plane crash. This person is not delusional, does not doubt the statistical unlikelihood of something going wrong, and does not assert any rational reason to assume that if they step on a plane, something will go wrong during the flight. Nonetheless, they believe, to the point of having panic attacks at the thought of flying, that air travel would be the death of them. Can this person be said to either have knowledge or be making a knowledge claim?

Sounds like question begging to me. This reads to me like:

(1) There is a person who doesn't believe that flying is dangerous.
(2) But, suppose they do believe flying is dangerous.

If they really think that flying won't hurt them, I don't see in what sense they really "believe" it will. People can have conflicting behaviors, and delusions are interesting cases of a no-man's land between belief and unbelief, but that doesn't mean we magically get two axes out of it - it's just a weird case of the one.

Another way of putting this is that both belief and claims to knowledge can be substituted salva veritate with "think."

If you believe in God, you think God exists. If you claim to know God exists, you think God exists, and vice-versa in both cases. So, there is only one parameter - whether something thinks God exists, and how strong their conviction is.

Ban's example here doesn't quite work as it should because he involved "dangerous," in number one, which is a concept that it tied to ethical considerations, which can never be separated from knowledge and belief when actually held.

Accurately stated, the example should involve:

(1) A person who has the knowledge, the conception, that they are unlikely to be involved in a crash, so there is little risk in flying(i.e. if they were to fly, the chance that flight were to be involved in a crash is low).

(2) This person has a fear of flying; they feel it is inevitable that the plane will crash, believing, contrary to the knowledge they have about the chance of the plane crashing, that it is a given the plane will crash.

Let P = "I am unlikely to die in a plane crash."

I know P.
I do not believe P.
If I know P, then I believe P.
So, I believe P.

Your example is contradictory. It is perfectly possible for people to hold contradictory beliefs, but that doesn't help your case.

[The Willow Of Darkness]

I Refute Berkeley Thus

The Willow Of Darkness

I Refute Berkeley Thus

The Willow Of Darkness

I Refute Berkeley Thus

Look, people - a belief is the same as a claim to knowledge. You can be more or less convinced of things. That's it. No compasses necessary - this isn't that hard.

That is wrong. One can, for example, believe that something is a certain way without actually knowing that it is. For example, I can believe that you are wearing bear suit without actually knowing that you are.

This is because "know" is a factive verb that presupposes the truth of its complement.

What I said is that the extent to which one believes something is the same extent to which one claims to know something, and these positions include claims to knowledge, not knowledge itself (otherwise there could not simultaneously exist these different positions).

If you think you have no knowledge of something whatsoever, in what sense do you believe it? Sounds like playing with words, to me.

Ah I see. The difference here is between conceptual knowledge and whether that the object of that knowledge actually exists in the world. In this instance, "knowledge" is knowledge that the conceived object, say the entity of a deity, exists as an object in the world, as apposed to "knowledge" awareness of the concept.

In the example of my last post, there is the conceptual notion of you existing wearing a bear suit, which I have, allowing me to take a position of belief that it is true you are wearing a bear suit. I haven't actually confirmed this is right though; I have not actually observed that bodily entity that holds your mind wearing a bear suit, so I lack the knowledge of whether you are actually wearing a bear suit and that my belief is reflective of reality.

If you believe that I am wearing a bear suit, then you think that I am wearing a bear suit, which is the same thing as thinking that you know I am, or making a knowledge claim.

To the extent you do not believe, you also do not think that you know.

I'm baffled that such a simple topic can cause so much confusion.

No, it isn't. I think you a wearing a bear suit, but I haven't actually seen the evidence, you body in a bear suit, that would confirm this, so I lack the knowledge of whether you are actually wearing a bear suit. My belief is not necessarily accurate knowledge of reality, even if I treat, as I do, that it is.

Your Idealist leanings will be blinding you here because this separation of belief and knowledge is usually dependent on the existence of an external world.

[I Refute Berkeley Thus]

The Willow Of Darkness

I Refute Berkeley Thus

The Willow Of Darkness

I Refute Berkeley Thus

The Willow Of Darkness

I Refute Berkeley Thus

Look, people - a belief is the same as a claim to knowledge. You can be more or less convinced of things. That's it. No compasses necessary - this isn't that hard.

That is wrong. One can, for example, believe that something is a certain way without actually knowing that it is. For example, I can believe that you are wearing bear suit without actually knowing that you are.

This is because "know" is a factive verb that presupposes the truth of its complement.

What I said is that the extent to which one believes something is the same extent to which one claims to know something, and these positions include claims to knowledge, not knowledge itself (otherwise there could not simultaneously exist these different positions).

If you think you have no knowledge of something whatsoever, in what sense do you believe it? Sounds like playing with words, to me.

Ah I see. The difference here is between conceptual knowledge and whether that the object of that knowledge actually exists in the world. In this instance, "knowledge" is knowledge that the conceived object, say the entity of a deity, exists as an object in the world, as apposed to "knowledge" awareness of the concept.

In the example of my last post, there is the conceptual notion of you existing wearing a bear suit, which I have, allowing me to take a position of belief that it is true you are wearing a bear suit. I haven't actually confirmed this is right though; I have not actually observed that bodily entity that holds your mind wearing a bear suit, so I lack the knowledge of whether you are actually wearing a bear suit and that my belief is reflective of reality.

If you believe that I am wearing a bear suit, then you think that I am wearing a bear suit, which is the same thing as thinking that you know I am, or making a knowledge claim.

To the extent you do not believe, you also do not think that you know.

I'm baffled that such a simple topic can cause so much confusion.

No, it isn't. I think you a wearing a bear suit, but I haven't actually seen the evidence, you body in a bear suit, that would confirm this, so I lack the knowledge of whether you are actually wearing a bear suit. My belief is not necessarily accurate knowledge of reality, even if I treat, as I do, that it is.

Your Idealist leanings will be blinding you here because this separation of belief and knowledge is usually dependent on the existence of an external world.

Again, my claim is not that belief is knowledge. My claim is that belief is a claim to knowledge. You are not attacking the actual point.

[The Willow Of Darkness]

I Refute Berkeley Thus

The Willow Of Darkness

I Refute Berkeley Thus

Ban

Suppose someone has an irrational fear of flying. They've had nightmares about dying in a plane crash. This person is not delusional, does not doubt the statistical unlikelihood of something going wrong, and does not assert any rational reason to assume that if they step on a plane, something will go wrong during the flight. Nonetheless, they believe, to the point of having panic attacks at the thought of flying, that air travel would be the death of them. Can this person be said to either have knowledge or be making a knowledge claim?

Sounds like question begging to me. This reads to me like:

(1) There is a person who doesn't believe that flying is dangerous.
(2) But, suppose they do believe flying is dangerous.

If they really think that flying won't hurt them, I don't see in what sense they really "believe" it will. People can have conflicting behaviors, and delusions are interesting cases of a no-man's land between belief and unbelief, but that doesn't mean we magically get two axes out of it - it's just a weird case of the one.

Another way of putting this is that both belief and claims to knowledge can be substituted salva veritate with "think."

If you believe in God, you think God exists. If you claim to know God exists, you think God exists, and vice-versa in both cases. So, there is only one parameter - whether something thinks God exists, and how strong their conviction is.

Ban's example here doesn't quite work as it should because he involved "dangerous," in number one, which is a concept that it tied to ethical considerations, which can never be separated from knowledge and belief when actually held.

Accurately stated, the example should involve:

(1) A person who has the knowledge, the conception, that they are unlikely to be involved in a crash, so there is little risk in flying(i.e. if they were to fly, the chance that flight were to be involved in a crash is low).

(2) This person has a fear of flying; they feel it is inevitable that the plane will crash, believing, contrary to the knowledge they have about the chance of the plane crashing, that it is a given the plane will crash.

Let P = "I am unlikely to die in a plane crash."

I know P.
I do not believe P.
If I know P, then I believe P.
So, I believe P.

Your example is contradictory. It is perfectly possible for people to hold contradictory beliefs, but that doesn't help your case.

Oh, the contradictory thoughts about the nature of reality are certainly there if they genuinely think that it is true they won't die in a plan crash, but this doesn't change that there is also a difference between belief and knowledge present. They don't simply believe it is unlikely they will die in a plan crash; they have seen the evidence that SHOWS they are unlikely to crash. They know, if their belief was to be in-line what was true about the chance they would crash, it would be a belief that a crash was unlikely.

In addition, the difference between belief and knowledge is critical to explaining people who believe that something is the case when it isn't.

[The Willow Of Darkness]

I Refute Berkeley Thus

The Willow Of Darkness

I Refute Berkeley Thus

The Willow Of Darkness

I Refute Berkeley Thus

This is because "know" is a factive verb that presupposes the truth of its complement.

What I said is that the extent to which one believes something is the same extent to which one claims to know something, and these positions include claims to knowledge, not knowledge itself (otherwise there could not simultaneously exist these different positions).

If you think you have no knowledge of something whatsoever, in what sense do you believe it? Sounds like playing with words, to me.

Ah I see. The difference here is between conceptual knowledge and whether that the object of that knowledge actually exists in the world. In this instance, "knowledge" is knowledge that the conceived object, say the entity of a deity, exists as an object in the world, as apposed to "knowledge" awareness of the concept.

In the example of my last post, there is the conceptual notion of you existing wearing a bear suit, which I have, allowing me to take a position of belief that it is true you are wearing a bear suit. I haven't actually confirmed this is right though; I have not actually observed that bodily entity that holds your mind wearing a bear suit, so I lack the knowledge of whether you are actually wearing a bear suit and that my belief is reflective of reality.

If you believe that I am wearing a bear suit, then you think that I am wearing a bear suit, which is the same thing as thinking that you know I am, or making a knowledge claim.

To the extent you do not believe, you also do not think that you know.

I'm baffled that such a simple topic can cause so much confusion.

No, it isn't. I think you a wearing a bear suit, but I haven't actually seen the evidence, you body in a bear suit, that would confirm this, so I lack the knowledge of whether you are actually wearing a bear suit. My belief is not necessarily accurate knowledge of reality, even if I treat, as I do, that it is.

Your Idealist leanings will be blinding you here because this separation of belief and knowledge is usually dependent on the existence of an external world.

Again, my claim is not that belief is knowledge. My claim is that belief is a claim to knowledge. You are not attacking the actual point.

And you are missing the point: such a claim to knowledge can be WRONG. Beliefs may all be claims to knowledge, but not all such claims are accurate knowledge. This is what the "knowledge" being referred to in the separation is. Knowledge that is known to be accurate to reality.

In some instances, such as belief in a deity, one make a claim that they belief and "know," in the sense of thinking that they have a true understanding or reality, but the can also admit that they do not have what is required to confirm that their belief is accurate to reality, hence , for example, agnostic(admit they do not have confirmation that their belief and claim to knowledge is accurate) theists(believe in a deity).